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Abstract
Our earlier article, Boundaries ofthe Prediction Modelin Tax Laws Substantial
Authority, analyzed the substantial-authority standard, identified factors that
taxpayers and their advisors can consider in determining whether substantial
authority supports a reporting position, distinguished substantial-authority
predictions from other types of predictions, and considered how substantial
authority affects advisors' ethical responsibilities. In short, that article pre-
sented a qualitative analysis of substantial authority. This Article presents a
quantitative model of tax law's substantial authority that introduces the con-
cepts of horizontal substantiality and vertical substantiality. The prediction
model places substantial authority and the other reporting standards on a
zero-to-one horizontal scale that depicts the likelihood that a position will be
upheld. Support for a reporting position satisfies horizontal substantiality if
it provides the reporting position the required threshold likelihood of being
upheld, which is generally thought to be around 40%. Vertical substantial-
ity derives from substantial authority's weight-of-authority method (i.e., the
weight of positive authority in relation to contrary authority). The Article
shows how to determine a value for vertical substantiality and convert it to
a value on the horizontal scale and apply the well-reasoned method to deter-
mine whether substantial authority supports a reporting position. The Article
presents the substantial-authority prediction model in a simple formula:
H = + R. The Article then illustrates how taxpayers and their advisors
might consider applying the prediction model. That exercise reveals some of
the model's shortcomings, which provide opportunities for additional work
in this area, but, more importantly, demonstrates how the model clarifies the
concept of substantial authority and some of its various components.
* Brad Borden is a professor of law at Brooklyn Law School and special counsel to Federman
Steifman LLP and Sang Lee (a 2016 graduate of Brooklyn Law School) is a Senior in Transac-
tion Advisory Services-Transaction Tax at Ernst & Young LLP in New York City. The authors
thank Jeff Erickson, Steven Dean, Heather Field, Tom Greenaway, Carolyn LaFon, David
Levy, Charlene Luke, Pamela Mable, Richard Nugent, and Ed Swails. The views expressed are
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of Ernst & Young LLP.
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I. Introduction
Our earlier article, Boundaries ofthe Prediction Modelin Tax Laws Substantial
Authority, describes the type of authority and the reasoning that taxpayers
and their advisors may use to predict the likelihood that a reporting position
will be upheld, for the purposes of assessing whether substantial authority
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supports a reporting position.' That article also distinguishes substantial-
authority predictions from other types of predictions,2 reviews the legislative
history and technical aspects of substantial authority,3 defines the scope of the
substantial-authority analysis, 4 and illustrates that other types of predictions
apply beyond the scope of substantial authority.' That article also considered
the extent to which substantial authority affects a tax advisor's ethical duties.'
This Article narrows the analysis of the substantial-authority standard, pre-
senting a quantitative model that converts the qualitative information into
numeric values of the probability that the reporting position will be upheld.
7 The quantitative model of substantial authority consists of vertical substan-
tiality and horizontal substantiality, which together incorporate the general
definition of substantial authority, the weight-of-authority method, and the
well-reasoned method. The model also provides a basic mathematical formula
that produces a value representing the probability that a reporting position
will be upheld. This Article presents the model, recognizing that more work is
required to accurately determine values for the model's variables. If that work
progresses, the quantitative model stands to provide a better method of pre-
dicting reporting-position outcomes than the current trust-my-gut approach
that some practitioners feel compelled to adopt.'
Because the legislative history and regulations present substantial authority
as a probabilistic phenomenon, the application of substantial authority calls
for a quantitative approach, which leads to the prediction model presented
in this Article. Part II presents the model's two primary axes: horizontal and
'See Bradley T. Borden & Sang Hee Lee, Boundaries of the Prediction Model in Tax Law'
SubstantialAuthority, 71 TAx LAw. 33 (2017). The purpose of the prediction model is to quan-
tify the likelihood of a position being upheld by the court if challenged by the Service, taking
into account both the weight-of-authority method and well-reasoned method introduced in
the earlier article.
2 Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 38-46.
3 Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 47-75.
'Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 75-79.
5Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 79-82.
6 Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 79-90.
7As demonstrated in our earlier article, "The regulations' use of the term 'likelihood of the
position being upheld' is a technical term. The term does not refer broadly to a probability
analysis. Instead, it refers to the result of an analysis that incorporates both the weight-of-
authority and well-reasoned methods, the notions of objectivity, and good-faith efforts to self-
assess tax liability. If, based upon such an analysis, a taxpayer determines that the outcome of
a reporting position is uncertain but has at least a 40% likelihood of being upheld, substantial
authority supports the reporting position." See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 76.
'See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 226 (2011) ("Simple equally weighted
formulas based on existing statistics or on common sense are often very good predictors of
significant outcomes."); PHILIP E. TETLOCK & DAN GARDNER, SUPERFORECASTING: THE ART
AND SCIENCE OF PREDICTION 21 (2016) (citing PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTI-
CAL PREDICTION (1954) to state that "well-informed experts predicting outcomes-whether
a student would succeed in college or a parolee would be sent back to prison-were not as
accurate as simple algorithms that added up objective indicators like ability test and records
of past conduct").
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vertical substantiality. It also discusses how they are relevant in assessing
whether substantial authority supports a reporting position, recognizing the
two axes pave the way for quantifying the measure of substantial authority.
Part III applies the weight-of-authority method to assign value to vertical
substantiality, demonstrates how to convert vertical substantiality into a value
on the horizontal plane, and shows how to apply the well-reasoned method to
determine whether substantial authority supports a reporting position. Part
IV uses cases to illustrate how courts have applied the weight-of-authority
and well-reasoned methods to specific tax matters to reach conclusions. The
selected decisions appear to contradict permitted authority, reflect a change
in practice, or otherwise draw heavily from legal reasoning. The cases show
how vertical substantiality and horizontal substantiality could work together
to determine the likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld. The
analysis then applies the model to a few uncertain reporting positions, dem-
onstrating how it might help clarify the likelihood that uncertain reporting
position will be upheld. Part V offers a brief conclusion.
II. Model's Axes
The definitional provision in the substantial-authority regulations and the
weight-of-authority method in the application provision of the substantial-
authority regulations both incorporate concepts of substantiality.' The defini-
tional provision uses "substantial" in relation to the likelihood of a reporting
position's being upheld.10 The weight-of-authority method uses "substantial"
to address the relation between positive and negative authority." Substantial
authority's prediction model distinguishes between the different uses of sub-
stantiality in the regulations by presenting the concept in the definitional
provision as horizontal substantiality and in the weight-of-authority method
as vertical substantiality.
A. Horizontal Substantiality
A horizontal scale from zero (no possibility that the event will occur) to
one (certainty that the event will occur) depicts all the possibilities that an
event will occur, as illustrated in Figure 1 below. The probability of an event
not occurring falls at the far left of the scale, and has a 0% chance of occur-
ring. The probability falls at the far right of the scale if the event has a 100%
chance of occurring. An event that is more likely than not to occur falls to
the immediate right of the center point of the scale (i.e., has greater than
50% chance of occurring). For uncertain tax reporting positions, the factor
being measured is the likelihood that the reporting position will be upheld.
Substantial authority occupies the space between reasonable basis on the left
'See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (definitional provision), (3)(i) (application provision); Borden
& Lee, supra note 1, at 59-67.
"oSee Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2).
"See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
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Figure 1: Likelihood of Position Being Upheld
(i.e., Horizontal Substantiality)
Likelihood that uncertain reporting position will be upheld
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
and more likely than not on the right. 12 Reasonable basis exists when the posi-
tion is more than merely arguable and significantly more than non-frivolous
or not patently improper.1 3 Other probabilities, such as "should" and "will,"
exist to the right of more likely than not."
Figure 1 depicts the scale of the likelihood of a reporting position being
upheld that applies to the understatement-penalty regime. The scale of the
likelihood of being upheld provides a visual depiction of horizontal substan-
tial authority-if the likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld lies to
the right of reasonable basis, within or beyond the substantial authority range,
the reporting position should avoid the substantial-understatement penalty
under the substantial-authority standard." The general understanding is that
12See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2); Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 35-36 (citing Canal Corp. v.
Commissioner, 135 TC. 199, 219 n.15 (2010); Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice,
64 TAx LAw. 301, 327 (2011); Statements on Standards for Tax Services, IRS Nationwide Tax
Forum, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, slide 3, 2010, https://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-utl/statements on standards for tax services.pdf).
'
3See Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
"See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 35-36 (citing Canal Corp. v. Commissioner, 135
TC. 199, 219 n.15 (2010); Robert P. Rothman, Tax Opinion Practice, 64 TAx LAw. 301, 327
(2011); Statements on Standards for Tax Services, IRS Nationwide Tax Forum, AM. INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, slide 3 (2010), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/statements
on standards for tax services.pdf).
1 5 Ihe legislative history of section 6662 suggests that a reasonable basis exists if a position
is arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in court upon complete review of the relevant facts
and authorities. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL ExPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAx EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982
218 (1982) ("This new standard will require that a taxpayer have stronger support for a posi-
tion than a mere 'reasonable basis.' Thus, a taxpayer is required to have more support for [a]
position than that it is arguable, but fairly unlikely to prevail in court upon complete review of
the relevant facts and authorities.").
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the reporting position would satisfy horizontal substantiality if it had at least
about a 40% chance of being upheld."1
B. Vertical Substantiality
The weight-of-authority method provides that " [t] here is substantial author-
ity for the tax treatment of an item only if the weight of authorities supporting
the treatment is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities supporting
contrary treatment."17 The regulations also enumerate permissible authorities
that a taxpayer may consider when applying this method." Weighing positive
authorities against negative authorities invokes the image of placing relevant
permissible authorities into a positive-authority stack or a negative-authority
stack and comparing the heights of the stacks. Consequently, the weight-
of-authority method is depicted as vertical substantiality. Quantifying the
weight of the respective types of authority will, of course, be a challenge,"
but the regulations appear to contemplate that at the end of the analysis some
quantum of authority generally will support a reporting position and some
quantum of authority generally will support the contrary position.20 Until
the law provides formal rules for determining vertical substantiality, taxpayers
should be allowed to exercise good faith in assigning values to relevant types
of authorities. Perhaps courts would accept such good faith values. 21 Figure 2
depicts a comparison of positive authority to negative authority (i.e., vertical
substantiality) using hypothetical values for the weights of positive and nega-
tive authority.
The regulations provide that the weight of the positive authorities must be
substantial in relation to the weight of the negative authorities, 22 but they do
not define what substantial means in this context. 23 The regulations do not
imply that the weight of positive authorities needs to be at least as great as
the weight of negative authorities. Nor does the language suggest that "sub-
stantial" in this context should have the same threshold as the substantial-
authority threshold on the horizontal scale. Thus, taxpayers are left to reason
through what substantiality means in the weight-of-authority method.
Under the weight-of-authority method, substantial authority is established
when "the weight of the authorities supporting the treatment is substantial
'See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 35-36.
'7See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3); Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 62-67.
"See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
'See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 65-67.
20See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i). Reporting positions may not always be binary. In some
situations, taxpayers may be able to consider reporting a transaction in multiple ways. For
instance, taxpayers who are considering whether a gain may be an ordinary or long-term capi-
tal gain might also benefit from considering whether the gain could be deferred or excluded.
To simplify the illustration, this analysis assumes binary reporting positions.
2 1See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 54-56, 61-62, 72-73, 75-77 (discussing the role of
good faith in the substantial-authority analysis).
22See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
23See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 65-67.
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Figure 2: Depiction of Vertical Substantiality
70
30
POSITVEAUTHORITIES NEGATVEAUTHORITIES
in relation to the weight of authorities supporting contrary treatment." 24
language suggests that the weight of positive authorities can be stated as a per-
centage of negative authorities. Thus, vertical substantiality can be presented
numerically as the weight of positive authorities divided by the weight of
negative authorities. One potential interpretation of the requisite relationship
between the respective authorities is that the weight of positive authorities is
"substantial" in relation to the weight of negative authorities if it is at least
40% of the weight of the negative authorities. 25 That interpretation would
make the weight-of-authority method the conclusive method for determin-
ing whether substantial authority supports a reporting position. Alternatively,
perhaps the weight of positive authorities is substantial in relation to the
weight of negative authorities if it is sufficient to allow taxpayers to conclude
that substantial authority supports a reporting position. 26 This latter interpre-
tation allows taxpayers to take the well-reasoned method into consideration
when assessing whether a reporting position meets the substantial-authority
standard. The prediction model presents the quantitative mechanics needed
to resolve which of these two alternatives is most appropriate for the weight-
of-authority method.
24Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
2 5Recall that commentators often conclude that a 40% likelihood of being upheld is the
threshold for establishing that substantial authority supports a reporting position. See supra
note 14.
26See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 68.
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III. Mathematical Presentation of the Model
The values from Figure 2, above, provide the starting point for consider-
ing substantiality in the weight-of-authority method. Recall that the weight
of positive authorities is 30 and the negative authorities is 70 in that figure.
With those weights, positive authorities would be approximately 43% of neg-
ative authorities (30 - 70). This result represents the vertical-substantiality
quotient, expressed in Formula (1), below:
(1) _
N
Where
V = vertical substantiality
P = weight of positive authority
N = weight of negative authority
At first blush, one might conclude that this 43% value is sufficient to estab-
lish substantial authority because the value of positive authorities is greater
than 40% of the value of negative authorities. The vertical-substantiality quo-
tient must, however, be converted to a value on the horizontal scale to help
determine whether a reporting position satisfies the substantial-authority
standard. Additional analysis reveals that a vertical-substantiality quotient of
40% probably does not translate into a 40% likelihood that a position will
be upheld. To illustrate, the vertical-substantiality quotient for a position that
has a weight of 70 for positive authorities and a weight of 70 for negative
authorities would be 100% (70 - 70).27 If the authorities weighed evenly for
and against a reporting position, and no other factors affected the reporting
position's likelihood of being upheld, the position would appear to have a
50% likelihood of being upheld because only 50% of total weight of authori-
ties that relates to the reporting position is positive (70 - (70 + 70)). Thus, a
position does not necessarily have a 40% likelihood of being upheld merely
because the weight of positive authorities is at least 40% of the weight of
negative authorities.
A. Translation from Vertical to Horizontal
Understanding that equal weights of positive and negative authorities
translate into a 50% likelihood of a reporting position's being upheld is the
foundation for translating the vertical-substantiality quotient into a value on
the horizontal scale. To translate vertical substantiality into a value on the
horizontal-substantiality scale, one divides the weight of positive authority
by the sum of the weight of the positive authority and the weight of negative
authority. The value on the horizontal-substantiality scale of a position that
27Te analysis assumes weights of authority to illustrate how the relative weights affect verti-
cal substantiality and translate to horizontal substantiality.
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has a weight of 70 for positive authorities and a weight of 70 for negative
authorities would be 50% (70 - (70 + 70)). Formula (2) presents the math-
ematical expression of the translation of the vertical-substantiality quotient
into a value on the horizontal scale.
(2) H=
P+N
Where
H= horizontal substantiality
Because the same variables affect both vertical substantiality and horizontal
substantiality, horizontal substantiality can be expressed as a function of vertical
substantiality, as depicted in the vertical-to-horizontal formula (Formula (3)).28
(3) H= V
V+ 1
Additional examples apply the vertical-to-horizontal formula and illustrate
how vertical substantiality translates into a value on the horizontal-substanti-
ality scale. As just shown, if the weight of positive authorities and the weight
of negative authorities are both 70, vertical substantiality would be 100%
(70 - 70) (i.e., V= 1), which would translate into 50% (1 - (1 + 1)) on the
horizontal-substantiality scale. Based on these calculations and the vertical-
to-horizontal formula, one would anticipate that vertical substantiality would
be greater than the value it translates into on the horizontal-substantiality
scale. Thus, although vertical substantiality may exceed 40%, it would trans-
late into a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale that does not meet
substantial authority's 40% threshold.
To illustrate, when the weight of positive authorities is 30 and the weight of
negative authorities is 70, vertical substantiality would be approximately 43%
(30 - 70). That value would translate into a horizontal-substantiality score
of approximately 30% (0.43 - (0.43 + 1)). Thus, even though, at first blush,
the weight of positive authorities may appear to be substantial in relation
to the weight of negative authorities based upon the 40% derived from the
vertical-substantiality quotient, the weight of authority might not translate
into a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale that satisfies the substantial-
authority threshold.
P28 is formula derives from the two formulas as follows: Using H- p,= , first fac-
tor out a P by multiplying the numerator and denominator by iP, so the formula
becomes H = 1+N/. Second, multiply both the numerator and denominator by PIN, so the
P/N
formula becomes H /-N+ Third, substitute Vfor PIN, so the formula becomes H= .
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The vertical-to-horizontal formula can be presented in a graph to illus-
trate the relationship between vertical substantiality and the score it trans-
lates into on the horizontal-substantiality scale. Vertical substantiality is the
independent variable, and horizontal substantiality is the dependent variable.
Consequently, a traditional graph of the relationship between the respective
types of substantiality would present vertical substantiality on the horizontal
axis and horizontal substantiality on the vertical axis. Viewing the horizontal-
substantiality scale on the vertical axis would be confusing, so the graph bucks
graphing convention and places vertical substantiality (the independent vari-
able) on the vertical axis and horizontal substantiality (the dependent vari-
able) on the horizontal axis (see Figure 3).
Figure 3: Relationship Between Vertical and
Horizontal Substantiality
a
4M
Horizontal Substantiality
1. Minimum Required Stand-Alone Vertical-Substantiality Value
The vertical-to-horizontal formula and its graphical presentation provide
a tool to more closely consider various aspects of substantial authority. First,
quantitative depictions present further insight into the regulations' provision
that the weight of positive authorities must be substantial in relation to the
weight of negative authorities.2 9 One might conclude that the weight of posi-
tive authority is substantial in relation to the weight of negative authority
only when it translates into a value on horizontal-substantiality scale of at
least 40%. Under that assumption, the graph suggests that the weight of the
29See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
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positive authorities must be greater than 65% of the weight of negative author-
ities to be substantial. Indeed, by rewriting the vertical-to-horizontal formula
to solve for V(V=- )and setting Hequal to the 40% horizontal threshold,
1-H
the formula reveals that vertical substantiality would have to be at least
66.67% for the weight-of-authority method to translate into a value of
the horizontal-substantiality scale of greater than 40% (0.4 - (1 - 0.4)
= 0.6667).30 That is a fairly high threshold for the relationship of posi-
tive to negative authorities. The discussion below regarding the appli-
cation of the well-reasoned method demonstrates that taxpayers may
be able to obtain the threshold horizontal substantiality, even if verti-
cal substantiality is less than 66.67%. Thus, the analysis does not con-
clude at this point that positive authority must equal at least 66.67%
of negative authority to be substantial. The analysis does, however,
confirm that the value for vertical substantiality will be greater than
the value it translates into on the horizontal-substantiality scale.
2. Limits of Translated Values
Second, the vertical-to-horizontal formula quantifies the limits of the values
on the horizontal-substantiality scale (zero to one) that can derive from verti-
cal substantiality. The curve of the graph of horizontal substantiality is asymp-
totic and could get closer and closer to one, but will never reach that limit. It
also can never be less than zero. The mathematical representation of the upper
Vlimit of horizontal substantiality is lim - = 1. To illustrate, vertical sub-
v- o V+1
stantiality could become very large if the weight of positive authorities was
very large or the weight of negative authorities was very small. For example,
if the weight of positive authority approached infinity or the weight of nega-
tive authorities approached zero, vertical substantiality would approach infin-
ity. Stated mathematically, vertical substantiality approaches infinity when
the weight of positive authorities becomes very large (li = , or the
weight of negative authorities becomes very small (im = , assuming
the weight of negative authorities will never be zero. 31 Nonetheless, as the
limit proof demonstrates, value on the horizontal-substantiality scale would
V30 This formula derives from the H -- formula by multiplying both sides by
V+ 1 to get V= H(V+ 1) or 1 = HV+ Hand then subtracting HVfrom both sides to get
V- HV= H. After factoringout Vand dividing both sides by 1-H, the formula becomes V= -H
1-H
31If the weight of negative authorities were zero, vertical substantiality would be undefined,
according to vertical-substantiality quotient, because a number divided by zero is undefined.
See Eric W Weisstein, Division by Zero, WOLFRAM MATHWORLD, last accessed Mar. 7, 2018,
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/DivisionbyZero.html.
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never exceed one because the vertical-to-horizontal formula would be
H " , when V= c, which gets very close to one, but never reaches it.00+1
Inversely, the bottom limit of the translated value on the horizontal-sub-
stantiality scale is zero as vertical substantiality approaches zero. To illustrate,
vertical substantiality would approach zero if the weight of positive authori-
ties was very small in relation to weight of negative authorities. This phe-
nomenon would occur for instance when the weight of positive authorities
approaches zero (1!m f = 0) or when the weight of negative authorities
approaches infinity (lim = 0 ). Assuming the weight of positive authori-
ties will never be zero, vertical substantiality could get closer to zero but never
actually equal zero.32 As vertical substantiality approaches zero the value it
translates into on the horizontal-substantiality scale will also approach
V
zero. The mathematical representation of this phenomenon is lim - = 0.
v-to V+1
Vertical substantiality will translate into a value on the horizontal scale that
is never less than zero and is always less than one. This is consistent with intu-
ition-most people cannot imagine a reporting position that has absolutely
no chance of being upheld or a reporting position that is absolutely guaran-
teed to be upheld. Something can always happen to allow a perceived impos-
sibility to occur. Even in situations that appear to be definitive, unexpected
outcomes are possible.33 Consequently, absolute certainty about a reporting
position is a nonevent, and the vertical-to-horizontal formula helps illustrate
that phenomenon.
3. Substantial Authority Supporting Multiple Reporting Positions
Third, the graph and vertical-to-horizontal formula also demonstrate how
"[t] here may be substantial authority for more than one position with respect
to the same item." 34 Substantial authority may support two reporting positions
in at least two situations. First, two positions can have substantial authority
mathematically, based solely on the weight-of-authority method. For exam-
ple, a position with vertical substantiality of 66.67% (e.g., 20 - 30) would
have an initial value on the horizontal-substantiality scale of at least 40%
(0.667 - (0.667 + 1)), and thus could be supported by substantial authority.
The contrary position on the same issue would have a vertical-substantiality
321f the weight of positive authorities were zero, vertical substantiality would be zero, assum-
ing the denominator is not zero. ROLAND E. LARSON, ROBERT P. HOSTETLER & BRUCE H.
EDWARDS, COLLEGE ALGEBRA 10 (1993).
33As discussed below, well-reasoned arguments can affect the outcome of a reporting posi-
tion. See infra Part IV. Thus, some of the intuition might be affected by logical reasoning
and permitted authority may not directly address an issue. Even without permitted authority
that directly addresses an issue however, a taxpayer may find some permitted authority that
addresses an issue tangentially.
31See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i).
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value of 150% (e.g., 30 - 20), which would translate into a value of 60%
(1.5 + (1.5 + 1)) on the horizontal-substantiality scale, which could also meet
the substantial-authority threshold. Thus, the two reporting positions would
appear each to have substantial authority, assuming the well-reasoned method
does not alter the outcome of either reporting position.
Second, two reporting positions could have substantial authority if the well-
reasoned method causes the horizontal substantiality of at least one position
to cross the threshold, assuming it would not cross the threshold based solely
upon the weight-of-authority method. For example, if the vertical substanti-
ality of one reporting position is 333% (100 - 30), that position would have
a translated value on the horizontal-substantiality scale of approximately 77%
(3.33 - (3.33 + 1)), so it would appear to have substantial authority using
only the weight-of-authority method. The substantiality of the other posi-
tion would be 30%, and that value would translate into a value on the hori-
zontal-substantiality authority scale of approximately 23% (0.3 - (0.3 + 1)).
The well-reasoned method should allow taxpayers to consider other factors
that could move that value far enough along the horizontal-substantiality
scale to achieve substantial authority in some situations.35 The question is, To
what extent can the well-reasoned method affect the horizontal-substantiality
value? The discussion now advances to consider that question.
B. Adjustment for Well-Reasoned Method
The qualitative analysis in the prior article concluded that the weight-
of-authority method and the well-reasoned method apply concurrently
to reporting positions. 36 Having established how the weight-of-authority
method may translate into a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale, the
focus turns to applying the well-reasoned method to the quantitative model.
The analysis above demonstrated that vertical substantiality of 40% translates
into a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale of just less than 30%.37
Based solely on weight of authority, the reporting position with those values
would not satisfy the 40% substantial-authority threshold. In some situa-
tions, the well-reasoned method could, however, move the value on the hori-
zontal scale, perhaps far enough to surpass the 40% threshold required for
substantial authority. In other situations, the well-reasoned method could
reduce the value translated from the vertical substantiality to a value on the
horizontal-substantiality scale and could cause the value to become less than
the substantial-authority threshold.
This analysis suggests that the well-reasoned method would appear to apply
after translating the weight-of-authority measurement (vertical substantial-
ity) into a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale. Formula (4) presents
the vertical-to-horizontal formula (Formula (3)), amended to account for
35See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 67-75.
36See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 67-75.
37See supra text accompanying note 30.
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the well-reasoned method. Formula (4) is a mathematical depiction of the
substantial-authority prediction model.
(4) H= V + RV+1
Where
R = well-reasoned method
A simple numerical example illustrates the application of the substantial
authority prediction model. If vertical substantiality is 40%, that value trans-
lates into slightly less than 30% (0.4 - (0.4 + 1)) on the horizontal-substan-
tiality scale. The well-reasoned method could apply to move the value to the
right on the horizontal scale (R could have a positive or negative value, so the
movement to the right suggests it has positive value). If the well-reasoned
method were sufficiently strong (at least worth 11.5 percentage points), it
could move the horizontal value from 30% to beyond the 40% threshold. An
illustration of this blending of the two methods is provided in the graph in
Figure 4. The discussion following the graph considers several issues that arise
with the application of the well-reasoned method.
Figure 4: Effect of the Well-Reasoned Method
t
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1. Effect on Horizontal Substantiality of Two Reporting Positions
Applying the well-reasoned method to the vertical-to-horizontal for-
mula raises the question of whether the well-reasoned method must cause a
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reporting position to lose substantial authority, if it causes a contrary posi-
tion to gain substantial authority. Assume a reporting position's vertical sub-
stantiality value is 30% (e.g., weight of positive authorities is 30 and weight
of negative authorities is 100). That value would translate into a value of
approximately 23% on the horizontal-substantiality scale (0.3 + (0.3 +1)).
With an addition of at least 17 percentage points from the well-reasoned
method, the likelihood of the position's being upheld would cross the 40%
threshold and appear to give the reporting position substantial authority. The
contrary position would have vertical substantiality of 333% (100 - 30),
which translates into approximately 77% on the horizontal-substantiality
scale (3.33 - (3.33 + 1)). If the well-reasoned method reduced that amount
by 17 percentage points, horizontal substantiality of the contrary reporting
position would be approximately 60%, meaning that it meets the substantial-
authority threshold. The total of the two values would be 100%, and substan-
tial authority would appear to support both reporting positions. Thus, two
opposing reporting positions can both be supported by substantial authority,
even after applying the well-reasoned method.
The next question is whether the well-reasoned method that moves the
horizontal-substantiality score for a reporting position, must move the hor-
izontal-substantiality score in an equal but opposite direction for a contrary
reporting position. In some situations, the equal and opposite movement for
any well-reasoned adjustment appears to be appropriate. For instance, a well-
reasoned argument that gain from the sale of property is capital should serve
as an equally compelling argument that the gain is not ordinary income.
Thus, the well-reasoned method would appear to have an equal, but opposite
effect on two reporting positions. Despite the apparent equal-but-opposite
offset of the well-reasoned method, it generally would not cause the substan-
tial-authority conclusion to change for two opposing positions. For example,
if vertical substantiality translated into a value of ten percent on the hor-
izontal-substantiality scale, horizontal substantiality for the opposing posi-
tion would be 90%. If the well-reasoned method moved the first reporting
position 30 percentage points to 40% on the horizontal scale, it should also
move the opposing position 30 percentage points to 60%. The well-reasoned
method would cause the 10% position to gain substantial authority by mov-
ing it to the 40% threshold, but it would not cause the 90% position to lose
substantial authority.
2. Magnitude ofAdjustment Caused by the Well-Reasoned Method
The well-reasoned method will rarely cause one reporting position to gain
substantial authority and another to lose it. To cause one reporting position
to move from below the substantial-authority threshold to above it and the
contrary position to move from above the threshold to below it, the well-
reasoned method would have to move the respective positions at least 22
percentage points in opposite directions. For instance, the well-reasoned
method would have to move one reporting position up from 39% to 61%
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and the other reporting down from 61% to 39%.38 Thus, reclassification of
both reporting positions by use of the well-reasoned method would be rare.
The well-reasoned method could also apply to show that a position that
might have a high vertical-substantiality score may miss the horizontal-
substantiality threshold after the application of the well-reasoned method.
Taxpayers may be able to make compelling arguments that a technical read-
ing of permitted authorities provides substantial authority for a reporting
position. Nonetheless, taxpayers should anticipate that the well-reasoned
method could apply to the reporting position, and it could potentially move
the likelihood below the substantial-authority threshold, allowing the Service
to successfully impose the substantial-understatement penalty.39 This could
explain why the government has been able to impose penalties in tax-shelter
cases in which preparers present technical arguments for their positions but
lose on the underlying tax matter and face penalties.40 As the Tax Court has
explained, construing a regulation does not entail just looking at the words or
phrases in isolation, but rather reading them in their context and with a view
to their place in the overall statutory regime."1 Thus, taxpayers must combine
the weight-of-authority method with the well-reasoned method to assess the
likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld and recognize that purely
technical arguments may not be sufficient to avoid penalties.
3. Problems with Assigning Relative Potency to Methods
The interaction of the weight-of-authority method and the well-reasoned
method raises the question of whether they have equal potency in all situ-
ations. The types of available permitted authorities may affect the potency
of the weight-of-authority method in relation to the potency of the well-
reasoned method, so the potency of the results of the two methods could
vary from situation to situation. For instance, some strong types of authority,
such as case law, may be tangentially related to a reporting position while
other weaker types of authority, such as a private ruling, may be directly on
point. The private letter ruling has less precedential weight than case law,
but when the private ruling is directly on-point it could have greater weight
than tangentially-related case law. Consider whether the weight-of-authority
method should have less potency in situations in which private rulings relate
to a reporting position than it would have if a statute or court opinion related
to the reporting position.
Two hypothetical scenarios help illustrate this point. In both scenarios,
identical authorities are the only permitted authorities that relate to the
reporting position. Under the first scenario, two circuit court decisions each
3 8The needed movement from the well-reasoned method would increase for any other two
starting points. For instance, if the starting points were zero and 100% the movement would
have to be at least 60 percentage points to cause the 100% position to lose substantial authority.
39See infra Parts IV.A.2 to A.3.
40See infra Part IV.A.3.
"See Shea Homes v. Commissioner, 142 T.C. 60, 100 (2014).
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support opposite sides of a reporting position, which will be decided by a
third circuit. The vertical substantiality of that reporting position would be
100%, translating into a 50% value on the horizontal-substantiality scale.4 2
Under the second scenario, two private letter rulings each support opposite
sides of a reporting position. The vertical substantiality of that reporting posi-
tion would be 100%, translating into a value of 50% on the horizontal-sub-
stantiality scale. Taxpayers may deem the vertical-substantiality value to be
more potent when the type of authority that leads to the value is perceived to
be stronger. For instance, they may believe that the score derived from the sce-
nario with case law is more potent than the score derived from private rulings.
Taxpayers therefore might consider taking the type of authority used for the
weight-of-authority method into account when applying the well-reasoned
method. For instance, if the weight-of-authority method relied primarily on
a private ruling, the taxpayer may wish to rely more heavily on the result of
the well-reasoned method. Despite the initial attractiveness of such a course,
attempting to attach relative-potency scores to the weight-of-authority value
and the well-reasoned value would most likely prove futile.
To appreciate the difficulty of assigning relative-potency scores to each
method, consider scoring the relative potency of the methods on a scale of
zero to one, with the total of the scores applied to each method equaling one.
This approach would reduce the overall value for a reporting position because
the weight-of-authority value and well-reasoned value would each be multi-
plied by a value less than one. For instance, if the weight of authority is very
weak, it might take a potency score of 0.1 and the well-reasoned value would
take a potency score of 0.9 (1 - 0.1). With such a scoring, a 37.5% weight-
of-authority value on the horizontal scale would become 3.75% (37.5 x 0.1)
after applying a potency score of 0.1, requiring the taxpayer to rely primarily
on the well-reasoned method to reach the substantial-authority threshold.
To cause the horizontal value to pass the substantial-authority threshold, the
value of the well-reasoned method, before applying the 0.9 potency score
would have to be at least 40.3% points. 43 If the well-reasoned value were 40%
prior to applying the strength score, it would become 36% (40 x 0.9) after
applying the potency score.
This type of potency assessment would make achieving substantial author-
ity very difficult for most uncertain reporting positions. Perhaps, the analysis
could correct for this problem by adding the difference between one and the
potency score of the weight-of-authority value to the potency score for the
well-reasoned method. Thus, if the potency score for the weight-of-authority
method were 0.1, the 0.9 difference could be added to the potency score for
42See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
(0.40 - 0.0375)/0.9 = 40.28%
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the well-reasoned method, giving it a 1.9 value. With such a scoring system,
a 22% value from the well-reasoned method would be sufficient to estab-
lish substantial authority (22 x 1.9 = 41.8).41 That result is suspect because
it would allow a taxpayer who is otherwise unable to meet the substantial-
authority threshold with either method to meet it by virtue of having a very
low weight-of-authority potency score, which would bolster the well-rea-
soned score.
The model does not appear to be conducive to including relative potency
scores for the weight-of-authority value and the well-reasoned value. Instead,
taxpayers should account for the different values when applying the well-
reasoned method. For instance, a weight-of-authority value based primarily
on private rulings could be offset (or bolstered) by a strong well-reasoned
method. Taxpayers should understand that the well-reasoned method could
significantly alter a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale derived solely
from private rulings and may have less of an effect on a score derived from
case law.
The substantial-authority prediction model could help taxpayers assess the
likelihood of a position's being upheld, as they apply it using these steps:
1. Determine the weight of authorities that supports the reporting posi-
tion and the weight of authorities that is against the reporting position.
2. Compare the relative weights of authorities to determine vertical
substantiality.
3. Translate vertical substantiality into a value on the horizontal-substan-
tiality scale.
4. Determine a value for the well-reasoned method.
5. Apply the well-reasoned value to the translated horizontal-substantial-
ity value derived from vertical substantiality.
6. Determine a final value that represents the likelihood that a reporting
position will be upheld.
If that final value is greater than 40%, substantial authority supports the
position. Figure 5 provides a visual depiction of the process, combined with
the qualitative policy analysis presented in Boundaries ofthe Prediction Model
of Tax Laws Substantial Authority.4 6
"Formula (5) presents an unworkable version of the substantial-authority prediction model
with adjustment for strength scores to both weight-of-authority value and the well-reasoned
value.
(5) H= SA V)+R-(2-SA)
Where
SA = Strength score of weight-of-authority value
(40 - 3.75)/1.9.
46See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 47-79.
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Figure 5:
Application of Substantial-Authority Standard
PollEy:
Baoato 1 1
IV. Case-Studies Related to the Applications of Model
Congress adopted a no-fault penalty regime for substantial understatements,
but, recognizing the law does not always provide certainty, it granted leeway
for taxpayers who must take reporting positions in the face of uncertain-
ty.7 Where a gap exists, the weight-of-authority method may not adequately
determine the likelihood that an uncertain reporting position will be upheld,
so the well-reasoned method clearly applies. Gaps in the law create one type
of legal uncertainty, but there are other types of uncertainty. Uncertainty also
exists if statutes or other sources of law are contrary to social norms or gen-
eral legal principles and a court might rule contrary to the published law.
For instance, Congress may enact a statute that society accepts at the time of
enactment, but rejects as time passes. As the statute loses favor, it becomes
susceptible to attack on policy grounds under dynamic interpretation," as
determined through a well-reasoned construction of the statute that consid-
ers current social norms. In these situations, the well-reasoned method may
trump the weight-of-authority method in determining the likelihood that a
reporting position will be upheld.
Uncertainty also exists if law provides technical support for a reporting
position that clearly is contrary to the purpose of the law or ignores economic
substance. In these situations, the well-reasoned method, based on general
principles like substance over form, may override the weight-of-authority
method that relies upon technical analysis. Thus, the well-reasoned method
1
7 See 128 CONG. REC. 21,611 (1982); see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXA-
TION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FIScAL
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982 217-18 (1982); Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 54-56.
"See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 72-75.
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could move a value based on the weight-of-authority method from above the
substantial-authority threshold to below it.
The following discussion illustrates how courts have used the well-reasoned
method to reach conclusions that differ from the result that would otherwise
be apparent under the weight-of-authority method. These decisions provide
the opportunity to consider whether substantial authority should support a
reporting position that is contrary to a statute, and, if so, how that support
could affect taxpayers who take reporting positions based upon application
of the weight-of-authority method or take the contrary reporting position
based upon the well-reasoned method. The analysis then considers how tax-
payers might apply the multi-step analysis to determine whether substantial
authority supports a reporting position that has little or no support under the
weight-of-authority method because little or no permitted authority exists
relating to a reporting position.
A. Derivation ofAnalyses fom Existing Case Law
In some situations, a well-reasoned construction of a statute appears to
require disregarding the statute's express language and relying upon other
tools to formulate tax law's support for a reporting position. For instance, in
some situations, social norms and government policies change as time passes
after the enactment of a statute, and those changes may prompt a court to dis-
regard the plain meaning or prior interpretations of the statute. Two examples
illustrate how courts account for changes in social norms and how taxpayers
might incorporate changing social norms and government policy into their
well-reasoned construction of statutes when considering whether substantial
authority supports a reporting position that is contrary to a statute's plain
meaning. The lack of significant analysis in cases that consider the existence
of substantial authority requires the discussion to draw from cases that apply
the well-reasoned method in other contexts. After considering the outcome
of those cases, the analysis considers how the quantitative prediction model
might have applied if the issues had raised the prospect of a substantial-
understatement penalty.
1. Changed Social Norms Nullift Explicit Statutory Language
United States v. Windso 9^ provides an example of a situation in which a
well-reasoned construction of a statute, based upon changing social norms,
prevailed over the plain meaning of the statute. In that case, Edith Windsor,
survived her wife, Thea Spyer. 0 The two New York residents married in
Ontario, Canada, but the State of New York recognized their marriage at a
time when same-sex marriages could not be performed in the state." Windsor
sought to claim an estate tax exemption for surviving spouses that removes
"United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
5old. at 749-50.
5
'Id. at 749-51.
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from the taxable estate of a decedent the value of any property that passes to a
surviving spouse.5 2 The definition of marriage in the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), enacted in 1996 before any state had enacted a statute to permit
same-sex marriage, applied to all federal statutes including estate tax law.5 3
That definition provided that marriage "means only a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."" Even
though Windsor and Spyer's marriage was legally recognized by the State
of New York, the plain language of DOMA as applied to the Code clearly
prohibited Windsor from claiming the estate tax exemption for property she
received from Spyer, so she paid the estate tax and sued for a refund." Ruling
in Windsor's favor, the Court held that the definition of marriage in DOMA
violated the Fifth Amendment by "seeking to displace [the protection in per-
sonhood and dignity afforded by the State of New York's recognition of same-
sex marriages] and treating those persons . . . living in [same-sex] marriages
[as] less respected than others [.1"56
To reach its conclusion, the Court recognized that New York and certain
other states had come to view the "limitation of lawful marriages to het-
erosexual couples" as an unjust exclusion, even though such marriages had
been deemed necessary and fundamental for centuries. 7 "New York acted
to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or
understood."" The Court recognized that the federal government had tradi-
tionally "deferred to state-law policy ... with respect to domestic relations,"
and DOMA deviated from that tradition. 9 It then explained how New York's
law conferred upon a class of people "dignity and status of immense import"
by recognizing same-sex marriage, and DOMA injures that same class. 60
Consequently, the Court ruled that DOMA violated the Fifth Amendment 1
and in so doing, nullified the plain language of the federal statute.
Consider how the Windsor decision informs the understanding of the sub-
stantial-authority analysis. The Constitution does not appear in the exclu-
sive list of permitted authorities, 62 so the use of constitutional arguments
can apply only through the well-reasoned method. With negative statutory
authority directly on point, and no apparent permitted authority to support
52See I.R.C. § 2056(a); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 752-53.
53See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); Windsor, 570
U.S. at 751.
5"See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), invalidated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
"5See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753.
56See id. at 755.
57See id. at 763.
58See id.
59See id. at 767-68.
6
oSee id. at 768-75.
6 See id. at 775.
62See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii); Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 62-63.
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the taxpayer's reporting position, the weight-of-authority value was very low
for the taxpayer in Windsor, perhaps approaching zero. Nonetheless, she won
based upon a well-reasoned argument that showed how the perception of
marriage had changed over time in the State of New York and how the people
of the state began to recognize the injustice of a narrow definition of mar-
riage. 63 That reasoning led the court to conclude that the statute was uncon-
stitutional. 64 The well-reasoned interpretation of the statute overcame the
unambiguous direct reading of the statute and a very low weight-of-authority
value (all of the apparent permitted authority appeared to favor the contrary
position). Now, consider whether the same reasoning would have been suf-
ficient to avoid a substantial-understatement penalty if the court had assessed
a tax and asserted a penalty under different circumstances.
Prior to Windsor, undoubtedly some same-sex married couples filed joint
returns in defiance of DOMA. The authors are unaware of the Service's chal-
lenging joint returns filed by same-sex couples prior to the Windsor decision,
but the situation of such couples would have been different from Windsor's
situation. The taxpayer in Windsor paid the tax and sued for refund.6 1 If she
had not prevailed in that case, she would not have received the refund, but
she would not have been exposed to the substantial-understatement penalty
because she had paid the tax. 66 To analyze the substantial-authority standard,
consider a thought experiment in which the Service challenged married
same-sex couple's treatment as being married and tried to impose penalties
on taxpayers whose filing status would have resulted in a substantial under-
statement. The question is whether, prior to the Windsor decision, such tax-
payers could have shown that substantial authority supported the reporting
position. Taxpayers fearing the imposition of a penalty would most likely be
unable to show that the vertical substantiality, based upon the weight-of-
authority method, was much greater than zero. DOMA clearly applied and
clearly excluded same-sex couples from the definition of married persons.
Thus, the taxpayers would have to show that the well-reasoned method pro-
vided an argument that was strong enough to provide their reporting position
had at least a 40% likelihood of being upheld.
Undoubtedly, same-sex couples facing a penalty for filing jointly would
have presented the arguments that the Supreme Court adopted in Windsor.
They would have had to convince the court that disregarded their married
status that their reporting position had at least a 40% likelihood of being
upheld based upon those arguments. In hindsight, following the Windsor
decision, the Court's application of the well-reasoned method and Windsor's
victory indicate that the reporting position of same-sex married couples filing
jointly should have had at least a 40% likelihood of being upheld against the
6 See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 763-64.
6 See id. at 775.
65See id. at 753.
66See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(5); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 753.
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Service's challenge of their filing status, if they adopted the reasoning the Court
applied. Consequently, they would appear to have had substantial authority
for the position, even though it was contrary to the statutory language.
Some observers may quibble with this conclusion that a reporting position
that defies a statute can be supported by substantial authority. These observ-
ers might argue that the statute was the law until the Supreme Court decided
Windsor, and, thus, substantial authority could not support any other inter-
pretation of the law. The substantial-authority standard requires taxpayers
to predict the likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld and allows
them to use the well-reasoned method in that analysis.67 When assessing the
likelihood that a position will be upheld, taxpayers should be able to consider
the arguments a court would consider in deciding the case. 68 A court would
consider the constitutional arguments, so taxpayers should also consider those
arguments when assessing whether substantial authority supports a reporting
position. In the years leading up to the Windsor decision, the likelihood that a
constitutional argument would prevail was increasing. At some point, before
the Windsor decision, undoubtedly that likelihood crossed the 40% thresh-
old. Consequently, there would have been substantial authority for same-sex
married couples filing joint returns prior to the Windsor decision.
2. Changed Social Norms and Policy Override Prior Treatment
In Bob Jones University v. United States,'6 the question was whether the
Service exceeded its authority by rescinding the section 501(c) (3) tax-exempt
status of two schools that had racially discriminatory admissions practices. 70
The rescissions followed a 1970 change in the Service's position regarding
the availability of tax-exempt status to schools that discriminate based upon
race in the admission process.71 The statute providing a tax exemption for
"[c]orporations ... organized and operated exclusively for religious, chari-
table . . . or educational purposes" did not change to reflect the Service's
changed position. 72 The schools argued that the plain language of the statute
granted educational institutions tax-exempt status and that the absence of
express language in the statute requiring all exempt organizations to be chari-
table in the common-law sense meant they qualified for the exemption. 73
The Court could not rely solely upon the statute to reach a conclusion that
supported the Service's position. The Court nonetheless held that the Service
did not exceed its authority in changing its interpretation of the statute, even
though the statute did not expressly prohibit racial discrimination and even
though the Service had not formerly denied tax exemption on account of
67See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 44-47, 67-75.
6 8See Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 75-77.
69See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).70See id. at 579-85.
7'See id. at 577-79.
7 2See 1.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954).
73See Bob jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 71, No. 3
566 SECTION OF TAXATION
racial discrimination.7 ' To reach this conclusion, the Court interpreted the
legislative history of section 501(c)(3) to incorporate the common-law con-
cept of charity into the statute.75 Once the Court had determined that the
statute incorporated the common-law definition of charity, it connected the
benefits bestowed upon charities to the public benefit the law expects them
to provide. 76 The Court thus concluded that section 501(c)(3) organizations
must serve and be in harmony with the public interest, and that the purpose of
these organizations cannot be so at odds with the community conscience as to
undermine any public benefit that the organization might otherwise confer.77
Legislative history and case law are permitted authorities,78 so their use would
come within the weight-of-authority method, but the Court also had to rely
upon the well-reasoned method to find support for the Service's position.
The Court showed that racial discrimination was at odds with the com-
munity conscience, thus undermining public policy. To show that racial dis-
crimination was contrary to public policy,7 the Court relied upon: "deeply
and widely accepted views of elementary justice";so pronouncements of the
Court, myriad acts of Congress, and executive orders that attest to a firm
national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public
education;" fundamental national public policy, as stated in case law;8 2 fun-
damental public policy expressed in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and numer-
ous other acts;8 3 executive orders that prohibit racial discrimination; 4 and
public policy." The Court also considered Congress's inaction, recognizing
that over the 12 years preceding its decision no fewer than 13 bills had been
introduced to overturn the Service's interpretation of section 501(c)(3), but
none of them had emerged from any committee. 6 None of these items are on
the list of permitted authorities, so their use comes within the well-reasoned
method. Based upon all of those statements of then-current public policy,
the Court ruled that racially discriminatory educational institutions do not
provide a public benefit and do not fit within the congressional intent of sec-
tion 501(c)(3). 7
The Court dismissed the schools' arguments that the Service lacked
authority to alter the scope of a statute because the Service is under oath to
74See id. at 605.
75See id. at 586-88.
76See id. at 588-91.
77See id. at 592.
78See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii); Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 62-63.
79See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 595.
soSee id. at 592.
"
1See id. at 593.
82See id.
3See id. at 594.
"See id.
1
5See id. at 595.
1 6See id. at 600.
87 See id. at 595-96.
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implement congressional will when Congress does not act to address a prob-
lem that arises." Speculating that Congress understood what the Service's
position was, the Court interpreted Congress's inaction as acquiescing to
the Service's position." The Court relied upon various forms of support that
fall outside the weight-of-authority method to conclude that "[c]learly an
educational institution engaging in practices affirmatively at odds with [the]
declared position of the whole Government cannot be seen as exercising a
'beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life."' 0 Consequently,
the Court found the Service was in the right to deny tax exemption to edu-
cational institutions that discriminated based upon race. The Court was able
to reach this conclusion, despite a prior understanding of the statute's plain
language and the Service's prior practice, by relying upon a well-reasoned
construction of the statute.
Bob Jones University is an example of a situation in which a taxpayer relied
upon the plain meaning of a statute and believes a reporting position is sup-
ported by the weight-of-authority method, but loses under the well-reasoned
method. The tax year at issue preceded the enactment of the substantial-
understatement penalty," so the Service could not have imposed that pen-
alty, and the question of substantial authority would have been irrelevant.9 2
Despite the inapplicability of the substantial-underpayment penalty the
decision provides a case study for considering how the weight-of-authority
method and the well-reasoned method might work in tandem.
In Bob Jones University, the weight-of-authority argument appeared to sup-
port the taxpayer, but the taxpayer lost because the government successfully
presented a well-reasoned construction of the statute.93 In this case, verti-
cal substantiality for the schools' reporting position would have been high
because the statute does not expressly address racial discrimination and schools
had qualified for tax exemption under the statutory language for some time,
despite maintaining discriminatory practices." Nonetheless, the statute does
"See id. at 596-97.
"See id. at 601.
9
oSee id. at 598-99.
9
"The tax years at issue in Bob Jones University were prior to 1980. See id. at 577-85. The
substantial-understatement penalty was enacted in 1982. See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324.
92Furthermore, the substantial-underpayment penalty only applies to income tax. See I.R.C.
§ 6662(a), (b)(2). Income tax for this purpose includes any income tax imposed under subtitle
A of the Code. See Reg. § 1.6662- 4 (a). The rules governing tax exemption are in subchapter
F of chapter 1 of subtitle A of the Code, so an income tax imposed as a result of losing tax-
exempt status should be subject to penalties under the current regime. Further, the unemploy-
ment taxes that the Service claimed that the University owed are outside of the purview of the
income tax laws. Employment taxes are in subtitle C of the Code, see I.R.C. %§ 3101-3512,
so an understatement of employment tax would not be subject to the understatement penalty.
The discussion of Bob Jones University nonetheless illustrates the manner in which a court
applied the well-reasoned method to a tax question.
"3See Bob Jones Univ, 461 U.S. at 598-99.
9'See id. at 599-600.
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not expressly prohibit the Service from denying tax exemption to schools that
discriminate." Consequently, one would expect vertical substantiality to be
significantly greater than 100% because the weight of authority supporting
tax exemption was greater than contrary authority. If vertical substantiality
were 125%, it would translate into a value of approximately 56% on the
horizontal-substantiality scale. The well-reasoned method would reduce that
value, but it probably would not reduce the likelihood of schools' report-
ing positions being upheld to less than 40%. Consequently, even though
the schools lost, if the Service had imposed the substantial-understatement
penalty, the schools should have been able to make a compelling defense that
substantial authority supported their reporting positions.
3. Application to Tax Shelters
When an issue of tax shelter is raised,' 6 the analysis addresses the overarch-
ing principles of tax law for both the substantive question and the question of
whether substantial authority supports the reporting position. 7 Specifically,
courts examine the economic realities" of the transaction at issue by apply-
ing the economic-substance doctrine and the substance-over-form doctrine.
15See id.
96See § 6662(d) (2) (C) (ii) (defining "tax shelter" as "a partnership or other entity, any invest-
ment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such
partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax");
Reg. § 1. 6 6 6 2 -4 (g)(2)(i) (describing tax shelter as "[a] partnership or other entity (such as a
corporation or trust), [a]n investment plan or arrangement, or [a]ny other plan or arrange-
ment, if the principal purpose of the entity, plan or arrangement, based on objective evidence,
is to avoid or evade Federal income tax. The principal purpose of an entity, plan or arrange-
ment is to avoid or evade Federal income tax if that purpose exceeds any other purpose").
9 7Authors acknowledge that "substantial authority" is not a taxpayer defense to the section
6662 penalty with respect to a section 6662 tax shelter. This section is intended to illustrate the
underlying principles of the substantial-authority defense.
9
'See Reg. § 1. 6 6 6 2 -4 (g)( 2 )(i) ("Typical of tax shelters are transactions structured with little
or no motive for the realization of economic gain, and transactions that utilize the mismatch-
ing of income and deductions, overvalued assets or assets with values subject to substantial
uncertainty, certain nonrecourse financing, financing techniques that do not conform to stan-
dard commercial business practices, or the mischaracterization of the substance of the transac-
tion. The existence of economic substance does not of itself establish that a transaction is not
a tax shelter if the transaction includes other characteristics that indicate it is a tax shelter.").
Furthermore, violations of the economic substance doctrine are now subject to a strict liabil-
ity penalty under the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, § 1409, 124 Stat. 1029.
99See Fidelity Int'l Currency Advisor A Fund, LLC v. United States, 747 F. Supp. 2d 49,
225 (2010) (holding that substantial authority cannot exist for transactions that either "lack
economic substance or must be recharacterized under the step transaction doctrine"); see also
Stobie Creek Invs., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 706 (2010) (holding that the prin-
ciple of substance over form overrides the cases cited by the taxpayer where the transactions
at issue lacked economic substance or must be disregarded pursuant to the step transaction
doctrine); Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 2d 122, 204-05 (D.
Conn. 2004); Santa Monica Pictures v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1157, 1229, 2005
T.C.M. (RIA) 1 2005-104.
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 71, No. 3
MODEL OF TAX LAW'S SUBSTANTIAL AUTHORITY 569
The economic substance doctrine, originating from the Supreme Court's
holding in Gregory v. Helvering,00 provides that "transactions that are shams,
or without economic substance, will not be recognized under the Internal
Revenue Code."o0 The economic substance doctrine can be tested through
an objective inquiry, a subjective inquiry, or both. An objective inquiry asks
whether the transaction "'appreciably affect[s]' a taxpayer's beneficial inter-
est except to reduce his taxes." 102 The subjective inquiry asks "whether the
taxpayers have shown that they had a business purpose for engaging in the
transaction other than tax avoidance." 103
The substance over form doctrine stands for the basic principle of tax law
that "incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction."o10
Along the same lines of this doctrine is the step transaction doctrine, which
stands for the principle that "effect should be given to the substance, rather
than the form, of a transaction, 'by ignoring for tax purposes, steps of an
integrated transaction."'10
Currently, substantial-authority defense is only available in limited circum-
stances when a matter relates to a tax shelter.10 6 In most, if not all circum-
stances, once the court finds that the transaction at issue is a tax shelter, the
analysis of whether substantial authority exists becomes moot. In such case,
it means that taxpayers who have acted with bad faith by engaging in a tax
shelter transaction may not now avail themselves of the substantial-author-
ity defense. New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner further supports the
notion that the underlying rationale for disallowing the substantial-authority
'Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
1 See Fidelity Int'l, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (holding that substantial authority cannot exist
for transactions that either "lack economic substance or must be recharacterized under the step
transaction doctrine").
'
02Id. at 231 (quoting Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960); ACM P'ship v.
Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (1998)).
03
od. at 232 (quoting Casebeer v. Commissioner, 909 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1990)).
0
'Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
105Fidelity Int'l, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 233 (quoting Falconwood Corp. v. United States, 422
F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
'
6See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (providing that the substantial-authority defense alone may
not reduce the amount of any item attributable to a tax shelter, including a partnership or
other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement that has as
a significant purpose the avoidance or evasion of federal income tax); Reg. § 1. 6 6 6 2 -4 (g)(1)(i)
(providing that a non-corporate taxpayer may reduce the amount of an item attributable to a
tax shelter with substantial authority only if "[t]he taxpayer also reasonably believed at the time
the return was filed that the tax treatment of that item was more likely than not the proper
treatment"); Reg. § 1.6662- 4 (g)(1)(ii) (providing that the substantial-authority defense is not
available under any circumstances for corporate taxpayers that engage in tax shelters unless the
transaction at issue occurred prior to December 9, 1994). Congress has also enacted penal-
ties for underpayments attributable to nondisclosed, noneconomic substance transactions and
reportable transaction understatements. See I.R.C. %§ 6662(i), 6662A.
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defense to tax shelters in certain cases is the lack of good faith in self-assessing
its reporting position.107
In New Phoenix Sunrise, the Tax Court disallowed the recognition of a
loss of approximately $10 million on the sale of stock held by the taxpay-
er's corporate subsidiary because the court found that the subsidiary's basis
in the stock was artificially inflated by a transaction that lacked economic
substance.10s The taxpayer, through its subsidiary corporation, entered into a
simultaneous purchase and sale of option contracts and contributed the long
and short options to a partnership newly formed with the president-CEO of
the taxpayer corporation.10' With the contribution, the subsidiary corpora-
tion stepped up its outside basis in the partnership by the amount of the long
position's premium but did not reduce its outside basis by the amount of the
short position's premium on the premise that short options are, more likely
than not, not treated as a liability for tax purposes.110
Shortly after, the partnership purchased stock in a third-party corpora-
tion."' Once the options matured, the partnership was liquidated. 112 The
taxpayer argued that the liquidation resulted in a step-up in the basis of the
assets formerly held by the partnership (i.e., the third-party corporate stock)
to the stepped-up outside basis of the subsidiary corporation.113 When the
subsidiary corporation later sold the third-party corporation stock, the sub-
sidiary corporation claimed a tax loss of approximately $10.5 million due to
the inflated basis it had in the stock." In addition to finding that the option
transaction lacked economic substance,"' the court also found that the tax-
payer lacked substantial authority."' The taxpayer claimed that it "relied
on caselaw in taking the position that the short option sold was contingent
and not required to be taken into account when calculating [the subsidiary
corporation]'s basis in [the partnership] ."117
In response to that claim, the court focused on the awareness that the
taxpayer and its advisors had with respect to the government's intent on
investigating "transactions substantially similar to the transaction at issue"
as potential tax shelters." Specifically, the court addressed the fact that the
taxpayer and its advisors were aware of Notice 2000-44 and subsequent Service
releases, which "warned taxpayers of transactions calling for simultaneous
'See New Phoenix Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 TC. 161 (2009).
osIhe case was issued in 2009, prior to the enactment of a strict liability penalty for viola-
tions of the economic substance doctrine. See supra text accompanying note 98.
'`New Phoenix, 132 TC. at 167-68.
"
0 Id. at 184-85.
..Id. at 169-70.
112d at 170.
13Id. at 172.
1"4id.
"15 . at 182.
6 Id. at 190.
"'Ijd.
"1d.
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purchase and sale of offsetting options which were then transferred to a
partnership.""' Hence, the court in New Phoenix Sunrise was not attacking
the taxpayer's technical argument that short options should not be taken into
account in the calculation of a partner's outside basis in a partnership. Rather,
the court was questioning the taxpayer's claimed reliance on the case law. In
other words, the taxpayer's lack of good faith in self-assessing its reporting
position makes its technical argument futile. 120
New Phoenix Sunrise demonstrates that tax shelters raise complex issues
related to the substantial-authority analysis. The taxpayers relied upon techni-
cal arguments, to support their claimed loss deduction. The cases they relied
upon are permitted authorities. The Notice and other Service releases that
the Service relied upon are also permitted authorities. Consequently, the
case could be made that the vertical substantiality in a case like New Phoenix
Sunrise would, at best, be 100%, which would translate into a 50% value on
the horizontal-substantiality scale. 121 The well-reasoned method would apply
a negative amount and move the value on the horizontal-substantiality scale
to below the 40% threshold. Even if a transaction is not a listed transac-
tion, the Service and courts may rely upon the well-reasoned method to show
the likelihood of the position being upheld did not meet the threshold and
impose a substantial-understatement penalty.
Taxpayers who engage in transactions that lack economic substance face
penalties in one of three ways. First, their technical arguments may lose to
judicial doctrines, such as the economic-substance doctrine, and they will
not meet the substantial-authority threshold under the weight-of-authority
test. In such situations, the well-reasoned method will only provide negative
results, so it will not help. Second, they could reach the substantial-author-
ity threshold under the weight-of-authority method, but lose ground when
the well-reasoned method applies. Third, if their transaction is found to be
a sham, their technical arguments will fail because those arguments would
apply to a transaction that did not exist. They would not meet the substantial-
authority threshold under the weight-of-authority method. Thus, even with-
out the statutory restrictions on the use of the substantial-authority defense
in tax-shelter cases, taxpayers would likely have a difficult time reaching the
40% threshold.
"'See Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 255.
'
20See Rosen v. Commissioner, 67TC.M. (CCH) 2082,2092, 1994TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 94,040
at 19-40 (finding that substantial authority existed where "the [taxpayer]'s position was sup-
ported by a well-reasoned, albeit erroneous, construction of Ohio law, which could be refuted
only after a complex and extensively researched analysis of various pertinent State and Federal
authorities").
'
21See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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B. Application ofModel to Reporting Positions122
Some tax issues that arise are not directly governed by clear law. There
are numerous areas in which tax law simply has gaps. Congress expressly
recognized this type of uncertainty in its legislative history that accompa-
nies the penalty regime. 123 Despite that uncertainty, taxpayers must make
reporting decisions. This part of the Article considers two situations that are
not governed by clear law and considers how taxpayers might apply the sub-
stantial-authority prediction model to determine the likelihood that report-
ing positions in these areas would be upheld. The application of the model
advances understanding of the substantial-authority standard and reveals
shortcomings of the model. In particular, the application reveals that the
lack of a weighting system limits the model's application and that the line
dividing the weight-of-authority method and the well-reasoned method is
not always clear.
1. Allocations in Accordance with Partners'Interests
The allocation of tax items to members of tax partnerships is a central and
complex aspect of partnership taxation. 124 Allocations are valid if they have
substantial economic effect or are in accordance with the partners' interests
in the partnership. 125 Relatively little authority exists regarding whether part-
nership allocations of tax items are in accordance with partners' interests in
a partnership. 126 Of course, partnerships can structure their arrangements
122Disclaimer: The discussion that follows and application of the model is illustrative. The
Authors recognize that taxpayers who are pressed to take a reporting position in the face of
uncertainty might find additional authorities that support their position or the opposing posi-
tion. They may draw different conclusions. The illustration is not intended to provide an
exhaustive analysis of the issues discussed. Instead, it draws upon the cited authorities, treating
them as the universe of permitted authorities that relate to the various reporting positions. This
approach allows the discussion to cover several topics and consider multiple potential applica-
tions of the substantial authority's quantitative prediction model.
'
23 See supra note 47; Borden & Lee, supra note 1, at 70.
12See Gregg D. Polsky, Deterring Tax-Driven Partnership Allocations, 64 TIx LAw. 97
(2010); Andrea Monroe, Too Big to Fail: The Problem of Partnership Allocations, 30 VA. Ix
REv. 465 (2011); Andrea Monroe, Saving Subchapter K Substance, Shattered Ceilings, and
the Problem of Contributed Property, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1381, 1433-35 (2009); Bradley T.
Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C.
L. REv. 297, 335-38 (2008); Darryll K. Jones, Towards Equity and Efficiency in Partnership
Allocations, 25 VA. TAx REv. 1047, 1074-79 (2006); Stephen Utz, Allocation and Reallocation
in Accordance with the Partners'Interests in the Partnership, 56 TIx LAw. 357, 364-66 (2003);
Walter D. Schwidetzky, The Partnership Allocation Rules of Section 704(b): To Be or Not to Be,
17 VA. TAx REv. 707, 708, 740 (1998); Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K SpecialAllo-
cations, 46 TAx L. REv. 1, 9-15 (1990); Lawrence Lokken, Partnership Allocations, 41 LIx L.
REv. 545, 613 (1986).
125See I.R.C. § 704(b).
12 6See Bradley T. Borden, The Allure and Illusion ofPartners'Interests in a Partnership, 79 U.
CIN. L. REv. 1077 (2011). Federal tax law generally treats limited liability companies that have
at least two members as partnerships. See Reg. § 301.7701-2 to -3. This Article uses the term
"partnership" to refer to all entities taxed as partnerships under federal tax law.
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to comply with substantial-economic-effect rules, 127 but those rules were
drafted for partnerships that adopt allocation-dependent equity structures
and are dated with respect to many current tax partnerships that adopt distri-
bution-dependent structures. 128 Consequently, partnerships often forgo try-
ing to comply with substantial economic effect and instead depend upon the
very vague rules defining partners' interests in a partnership to claim their
allocations have substantial economic effect. 129 Because the rules are not clear,
they cannot definitively establish whether some allocations are or are not in
accordance with the partners' interests in a partnership. 130 This is thus an
area of law in which a gap exists, often making the reporting position related
to the allocations uncertain. Consequently, taxpayers cannot reach a defini-
tive conclusion under the weight-of-authority method and must rely upon
a well-reasoned construction of the statute and regulations to determine the
likelihood that their allocations are in accordance with partners' interests in
a partnership. 131 An example illustrates how taxpayers might assess the likeli-
hood of an allocation being upheld based on partners' interests in a partner-
ship, and whether reliance on partners' interest in a partnership meets the
substantial-authority threshold.
Example. Assume that Ingrid contributes $1,000,000 in exchange for Class
A and Class B interests in REF LLC, a tax partnership, formed to acquire and
manage residential real estate. Miguel receives Class B interests in exchange
for agreeing to manage REF LLC. Ingrid contributes 100% of the capital and
Miguel contributes 100% of the member services to the LLC. The Class A
interests entitle Ingrid to distributions of available cash until she has received
her $1,000,000 contribution plus an 8.5% preferred return on her contri-
bution. The Class B interests entitle Ingrid to 80% and Miguel to 20% of
available cash that remains after REF LLC satisfies the Class A distribution
requirements. The REF LLC operating agreement provides that the LLC
will allocate taxable income to holders of Class A interests to the extent of
accrued, unpaid preferred return. It will then allocate any remaining income
to the Class B holders in proportion to their Class B interests. REF LLC does
not attempt to satisfy the test for substantial economic effect, and its operat-
ing agreement provides that allocations will be in accordance with members'
127See § 704(a)-(b); Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2).
128 See, e.g., Daniel S. Goldberg, The Target Method for Partnership Special Allocations and
Why It Should be Safe-Harbored, 69 TIx LAw. 663 (2016); Bradley T. Borden, Equity Structure
ofNoncorporate Entities, 31 RFAL EST. FIN. J., Summer/Fall 2016, at 35.
129See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3) (providing generally for a facts-and-circumstances test and list
of factors to consider in determining whether allocations are in accordance with the partners'
interests in the partnership).
'
3
oSee Borden, supra note 126, at 1103-27 (describing how the rules in the regulations do
not provide a definitive answer about the partners' interests in a partnership in many situations).
31 In case of partners' interests in a partnership, both the statute and regulations address
the concept, but the regulations provide the general rules relating to the definition. See § 704;
Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(3).
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 71, No. 3
573
574 SECTION OF TAXATION
interests in the LLC. In Year 1, REF LLC has $650,000 of taxable income
and $750,000 of available cash that it will distribute.
According to the REF LLC operating agreement, Ingrid would receive all
$750,000 of the available cash-$85,000 as a preferred return ($1,000,000
x 8.5%) and $665,000 as a return of investment. REF LLC would allocate
$85,000 of taxable income to Ingrid to match her accrued preferred return.
Of the remaining $565,000, it will allocate 80% ($452,000) to Ingrid and
20% ($113,000) to Miguel. Thus, the total allocated to Ingrid would be
$537,000 ($85,000 + $452,000) and the total allocated to Miguel would
be $113,000, and REF LLC would allocate approximately 83% ($537,000
- $650,000) of taxable income to Ingrid and 17% ($113, 000 - $650,000)
to Miguel. Miguel and Ingrid must consider whether the allocations are in
accordance with their interests in REF LLC, and what the likelihood is that
the allocations will be upheld.
Miguel and Ingrid would most likely begin their analysis in the regulations,
which provide guidance on how to determine the partners' interests in a part-
nership. The regulations adopt a facts-and-circumstances approach and pro-
vide several factors that indicate the partners' interests. 132 The factors in those
regulations are (1) the partners' relative contributions to the partnership, (2)
the partners' interests in the partnership's economic profits and losses, (3) the
partners' interests in the partnership's cash flows and non-liquidating distri-
butions, and (4) the partners' rights to distributions on liquidation. 133
In some situations, applying those factors might definitively establish the
partners' interests in a partnership. For instance, if a partnership allocates eco-
nomic items and makes distributions in proportion the partners' proportion-
ate contributions, the result for each factor equals the partners' proportionate
contributions. REF LLC's situation is different from that basic situation
because the values of the several factors may never be the same, and the values
of each factor may vary from year to year, as a result of the entity's distribution
structure. Nonetheless, Ingrid and Miguel must determine whether there is
substantial authority for claiming the allocations are in accordance with their
interests in REF LLC. They could start their analysis by considering the val-
ues of the several factors in the regulations.
Relative Contributions. The first step of the analysis is to determine the
relative values of the contributions. The relative values of the members' dif-
ferent types of contributions are not obvious. Ingrid contributed $1,000,000
of cash, and Miguel agreed to contribute services. They must attach a value
to Miguel's promised services to be able to determine the members' relative
contributions. One way to consider the value of Miguel's contribution is to
consider the amount of the LLC's value that the LLC would receive if the
LLC's value became worth billions or trillions of dollars before liquidated. If
that were to happen, Miguel's share of total value would get closer and closer
132See Reg. § 1.704-1(b) (3) (i)-(ii).
'33See Reg. § 1.704-2(b)(3).
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to the 20%-the available cash after REF LLC returned Ingrid's contribution
and paid her preferred return-but his share would never actually reach 20%.
Consequently, Miguel's contribution appears to be less than 20% of total
contributions. Furthermore, LLC probably will not experience that type of
growth, so the parties must believe that Miguel's contributions are less than
20% of total contributions. They might determine a relative value of his con-
tribution by estimating the percentage of the total distributions that Miguel
would receive. For instance, they may estimate that Miguel will receive 13%
of total distributions over the life of REF LLC.134 Thus, for the first factor,
they may determine that Miguel's services total 13% of total contributions,
and Ingrid's capital contribution is 87% of the total.
Interests in Profits and Losses. The next part of the analysis is to deter-
mine the members' interests in REF LLC's profits and losses. The operating
agreement does not specify the members' interests in profits and losses. It
only provides for the allocation of taxable income and loss. If profits were
to equal taxable income, perhaps they would consider using their respective
shares of taxable income as a measure of their shares of profit. The analysis
to test interests in profits for purpose of testing allocations would be circu-
lar if it relied upon allocations to determine the members' shares of profits
and losses. Consequently, this factor most likely does not refer to shares of
taxable income.
Perhaps they would consider their current shares of distributions to deter-
mine their shares of profits. Over the life of REF LLC, the members will
receive all of their shares of REF LLC's profits through distributions and thus
be able to determine their shares of profits only after REF LLC liquidates.
The amount of available cash exceeds REF LLC's taxable income at the end
of the current year. The difference between tax accounting and computation
of cash flow may explain why the amount of cash available for distribution
exceeds taxable income. Available cash may also differ from the current year's
profits. Thus, REF LLC cannot merely follow distributions to determine the
members' shares of profits and losses. Consequently, Ingrid and Miguel may
realize that a value for their interests in profits and losses is not available in
Year 1.
Interests in Cash Flows. Ingrid and Miguel must next consider their interests
in the cash flows of REF LLC. The regulations do not describe how partners
should determine their interests in partnership cash flows. Perhaps the LLC's
available cash represents its cash flows. At the end of the first year, Ingrid's
undistributed preferred return would be $85,000 ($1,000,000 x 8.5%),
and her unreturned contribution would be $1,000,000. After distributing
$85,000 as a preferred return, REF LLC would distribute the remaining
$665,000 of available cash to Ingrid as a return of her contribution. Thus,
1
3 1n some situations, the ultimate payout may not reflect the relative value of contributions
because the members may determine that the members' respective returns on contributions
may vary.
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REF LLC is distributing $750,000 of available cash, all of which will go to
Ingrid. If that $750,000 represents REF LLC's cash flows for the year, Ingrid's
interest in those cash flows would be 100% and Miguel's would be zero.135 Of
course, if the LLC's cash flows differ from available cash, then the member's
interest in the LLC's cash flows may differ from their interests in available
cash. Ultimately their interest in cash flows will equal their interests in dis-
tributed available cash, but they will not know their interests in total available
cash until the LLC liquidates.
Interests in Non-Liquidating Distributions. The next step is to consider
Ingrid's and Miguel's interests in non-liquidating distributions. As just shown,
Ingrid would receive 100% of a non-liquidating distribution in Year 1 and
Miguel would receive zero percent. Those amounts appear to represent their
Year 1 interests in non-liquidating distributions.
Rights to Liquidating Distributions. Finally, Ingrid and Miguel would con-
sider their rights to distributions on liquidation. If REF LLC were to liqui-
date at the end of Year 1, before making any other distribution, it would have
$1,750,000 million to distribute ($750,000 of available cash + $1,000,000
contribution). Thus, if REF LLC were to liquidate at the end of the Year 1,
before making any other distribution, instead of making the $750,000 distri-
bution, it would distribute $1,085,000 ($1,000,000 contribution + $85,000
return) to Ingrid on her Class A interests and distribute 80% ($532,000) of the
remaining $665,000 to Ingrid and 20% ($133,000) to Miguel. Ingrid's total
distribution would be $1,617,000 ($1,085,000 + $532,000) and Miguel's
would be $133,000. Ingrid's percentage of the total distribution would be
92.4% ($1,617,000 - $1,750,000) and Miguel's would be 7.6% ($133,000
- $1,750,000). These percentages would appear to present a snapshot as of
the end of Year 1 of what the members' interests in liquidating distributions
might be. Table 1 summarizes the allocations and the factors the regulations
provide for determining the partners' interests in a partnership. Notice that at
the end of the first year, the percentages of many of the factors differ.
l3 5 1f the $750,000 represented a fraction of REF LLC's cash flows, perhaps the members'
interests in them would be something other than 100% and 0%. This analysis ensures the
$750,000 is REF LLC's cash flows for the year.
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Table 1: Summary of Factors of Partners' Interests (end of Year 1)
Dollar amount Percentage
Factor Ingrid Miguel Ingrid Miguel
Tax-Item $537,000 $113,000 83% 17%Allocations
$01. Contributions $1,000,000 .i 87% 13%Services
2. Share of profits N/A N/A N/A N/A
and losses
3. Interests in $750,000 $0 100% 0%
cash flows
4. Interests
in non-liuiatn $750,000 $0 100% 0%liquidating
distributions
5. Interests in
liquidating $1,617,000 $133,000 92.4% 7.6%
distributions
Notice that the 83% of total tax items allocated to Ingrid is less than any
of her percentage interest in any of the factors used to determine partners'
interests in the partnership, and Miguel's 17% of tax items is greater than
his percentage interest in any of the factors. The values of the various factors
will most likely vary from year to year, so Ingrid and Miguel may consider
results of another year when considering the likelihood that their allocations
will be upheld.
Assume that at the end of Year 2, REF LLC has $500,000 of available cash
and $625,000 of taxable income. The REF LLC operating agreement pro-
vides that it would allocate the taxable income first to Ingrid to the extent of
her $28,475 accrued preferred return ($335,000 unreturned capital at begin-
ning of Year 2 x 8.5%). REF LLC would allocate 80% ($477,220) of the
remaining $596,525 ($625,000 - $28,475) to Ingrid and 20% ($119,305)
to Miguel. Thus, the total allocation to Ingrid will be $505,695 ($28,475 +
$477,220) and to Miguel it would be $119,305. Ingrid's share of the alloca-
tion would be 81% and Miguel's would be 19%.
Again, Ingrid and Miguel will consider the factors to determine whether
the allocations are in accordance with their interests in REF LLC. The mem-
bers' shares of contributions would not change, and their shares of profits and
losses would still be uncertain. The challenge of identifying interests in cash
flow will remain, but it would appear to be similar to their interests in non-
liquidating distributions.
Interests in Non-Liquidating Distributions. REF LLC will distribute the
$500,000 of available cash first to satisfy Ingrid's undistributed preferred
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return then to return her unreturned capital contribution. Ingrid's undistrib-
uted preferred return will be $28,475 ($335,000 unreturned capital x 8.5%).
Her remaining unreturned contribution will be $335,000 ($1,000,000 con-
tribution - $665,000 distribution at the end of Year 1). After satisfying those
distribution obligations, REF LLC will have $136,525 of available cash for
non-liquidating distributions ($500,000 - $28,475 - $335,000). It will dis-
tribute that cash 80% ($109,220) to Ingrid and 20% ($27,305) to Miguel.
Ingrid's total non-liquidating distribution will be $472,695 ($335,000 unre-
turned contribution + $28,475 preferred return + $109,220 residual) and
Miguel's will be $27,305. Thus, Ingrid would receive 94.54% ($472,695
- $500,000) of the non-liquidating distribution and Miguel would receive
5.46% ($27,305 - $500,000) of the distribution.
Rights to Liquidating Distributions. If REF LLC were to liquidate at the end
of Year 2 instead of making interim distributions, it would have $1,900,000 to
distribute. It would distribute $500,000 in the same manner it would have if
it had made the interim distribution, and it will distribute 80% ($1,120,000)
of the remaining $1,400,000 to Ingrid and 20% ($280,000) to Miguel.
Ingrid's total liquidating distribution would be $1,592,695 ($1,120,000 +
$472,695), which is 83.83% of the $1,900,000 total. Miguel's total distri-
bution would be $307,305 ($280,000 + $27,305), which is 16.17% of the
$1,900,000 total. Notice that the values for Year 2 in Table 2 for the several
factors differ somewhat from the values for Year 1 in Table 1.
Table 2: Summary of Factors of Partners' Interests (end of Year 2)
Dollar Amount Percentage
Factor Ingrid Miguel Ingrid Miguel
Tax-Item
Allcatons$505,695 $119,305 81% 19%Allocations
1. Contributions $1,000,000 $0 Services 87% 13 %
2. Share of profits N/A N/A N/A N/A
and losses
3. Interests in cash $472,695 $27,305 94.54% 5.46%flows
4. Interests in
non-liquidating $472,695 $27,305 94.54% 5.46%
distributions
5. Interests in
liquidating $1,592,695 $307,305 83.83% 16.17%
distributions
In Year 2, the percentage of taxable income allocated to Ingrid is less than
her percentage of any other factor, and the percentage of taxable income allo-
cated to Miguel is greater than his percentage of any other factor. Miguel
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and Ingrid might now consider whether the allocations are in accordance
with their interests in REF LLC. This confirms that the values for the various
factors not only generally fail to be identical within any given tax year, but
they can also vary from year to year.136 The variability makes determining the
members' interests in REF LLC challenging. Despite the inconclusiveness of
the definition of partners' interests in a partnership, partnerships must allo-
cate taxable income to their members. However, the law does not definitively
establish whether the allocations are in accordance with the members' inter-
ests. Consider approaches that Ingrid and Miguel might deploy to address the
lack of authority in this area and determine if substantial authority supports
the allocations. They should first apply the weight-of-authority method and
then the well-reasoned method.
The analysis under the weight-of-authority method may first deem that
the allocation of any tax item is in accordance with the partners' interests
in the partnership if it follows the allocation of a corresponding economic
item. 137 Identifying allocations of economic items in this context is challeng-
ing because the REF LLC operating agreement only provides for allocations
of tax items and distributions of cash. The several factors indicate their inter-
ests in various other items, but the percentages of taxable income allocated
to Ingrid and Miguel in Year 1 and Year 2 are not the same as any of the
percentages representing the various factors. Thus, if the allocations of taxable
income must reflect the percentages of at least one factor, this analysis would
weigh against the validity of the allocations.
Another approach would be to conclude that as long as the allocations of
taxable income for any partner are within a range of percentages, from the
highest percentage in the list of factors to the lowest percentage in the list
of factors, for any one individual they should be valid.138 No listed author-
ity directly sanctions this approach, but an example in the regulations uses
a range to provide a safe harbor for assessing whether allocations of nonre-
course deductions are in accordance with the members' interests in a part-
nership.13 9 Ingrid's and Miguel's allocations of taxable income do not come
within that range, so they could not rely upon the example as positive author-
ity. Nonetheless, that example relates to interests in a partnership, Ingrid and
Miguel might deem that example to be a tangentially related, permitted
authority that applies to their situation. They would, however, hope it is weak
authority because it does not support their reporting position.
The range appears in an example in the regulations that is not part of
the definition of partners' interest in a partnership. Three reasons therefore
reduce its weight as authority. First, the range is part of an example, not the
text of a rule, so it should not be read to invalidate any allocations that fall
"'See Borden, supra note 126, at 1112-27.
11
7See Borden, supra note 126, at 1133-37.
1
3
1See Borden, supra note 126, at 1135.
1'9See Reg. § 1.704-2(m), Ex. (1)(ii).
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outside the range. Second, the nonrecourse-deduction rule was not written
for the definition of partners' interest in a partnership outside of the context
of nonrecourse deductions. Third, the example illustrates a safe harbor, so it
does not address situations that extend beyond those to which it provides cer-
tainty. Consequently, the example in the regulation is not very strong author-
ity against Ingrid's and Miguel's reporting positions. Even though Ingrid's
and Miguel's allocations are beyond the range established by the factors, they
would assign a very low weight to the example as negative authority for ignor-
ing the range. 140
Here, the weight-of-authority method may assign a very low negative
weight to the tangential example in the nonrecourse-deduction regulations.
The multiple-factor test is inconclusive. It does not establish a single value
for the members' interests in REF LLC, and the tax-item allocations are not
consistent with values of any of the factors. Based upon this analysis, Ingrid
and Miguel may conclude that the negative permitted authorities outweigh
the positive authorities. Perhaps they would conclude that weight of posi-
tive authority is 10 and the weight of negative authority is 3, so the vertical
substantiality value would be 33.33%, which would translate into a value of
25% (0.333 - (1 + 0.3333)).
Under the well-reasoned method, Ingrid and Miguel would most likely
note that (1) nothing suggests that they used the allocations to affect their
respective tax liabilities, and (2) they used a reasonable method to allocate
income. Consider how Miguel and Ingrid might analyze whether these allo-
cations are in accordance with their interest in REF LLC under the well-
reasoned method. Over the life of the partnership, the sum of the preferred
return distributions and the residual distributions will equal REF LLC's tax-
able income. Thus, allocations of taxable income, first to Ingrid to the extent
of her accrued preferred return and then to the members in accordance with
their rights to residual equity, will ultimately reflect their shares of the entity's
income, as reflected in distributions that exceed a return of Ingrid's capital.
This life-of-the-partnership approach would appear to support their alloca-
tions, as everything will eventually even out. The timing of allocations and
distributions may not accurately track with current distributions, but the
totals over time will be equal. Based on that analysis, they may reason that
their allocations are not the type that the regulations and case law disfavor"'
and that the allocations are in accordance with their interests in REF LLC
because they reflect the distributions of income that the members will receive.
40Contrast this situation with one in which the allocations came within the range estab-
lished by the factors. In such a situation, taxpayers might deem the example in the nonre-
course-deductions regulations to be positive authority for treating them as being in accordance
with the partners' interests in the partnership.
"'Regulations and case law generally disfavor allocations that the members use strictly for
tax purposes to reduce the members' overall tax liability. See, e.g., Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55
TC. 395 (1970); Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2).
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Ingrid and Miguel may conclude that the well-reasoned method provides a
better analysis of their interests in REF LLC than does the weight-of-author-
ity method. Based upon this reasoning, Ingrid and Miguel may conclude
that the well-reasoned method supports the allocations and increases hori-
zontal substantiality more than 15 percentage points. That amount combined
with the vertical substantiality value would move support for their position
beyond substantial-authority threshold. Thus, if a court were to rule that the
allocations were not according to the members' interest, a substantial-under-
statement penalty should not be imposed.
2. Limited Partner and Self-Employment Income
The definition of net earnings from self-employment is another area of
uncertainty worthy of analysis. The distributive share of income of members
of tax partnerships generally comes within the definition of net earnings from
self-employment.142 An exception to that rule applies to limited partners,
whose distributive shares are exempted from the definition of net earnings
from self-employment, if they are not guaranteed payments for services.143
Congress enacted the limited-partner exception before limited liability com-
panies (LLCs) had become mainstream, 14 so it did not consider whether
a member of an LLC could come within the definition of limited partner
for purpose of the tax on self-employment income. Since the enactment of
the limited-partnership exception, LLCs have become prominent, and the
question arises whether the limited-partner exception applies to members of
LLCs, and, if so, under what circumstances.
Example. Consider the context in which this issue might arise. Doug is
one of three members of Three Person LLC. Three Person LLC's operating
agreement provides that the LLC will be member-managed, and Doug, as
managing member, will have all management authority. The LLC will pay
Doug $175,000 for work he does as managing member and will allocate
and distribute all income (after paying $175,000 to Doug) equally among
the members. Doug recognizes that the $175,000 payment for his services
will come within the definition of net earnings from self-employment,1 4 1
but he would like to treat his one-third share of income as an allocation of
income to a limited partner that is excluded from the definition of net earn-
ings from self-employment. Consider how he might analyze this matter to
'
42See I.R.C. § 1 4 02(a). Section 1402 is in chapter 2 of subtitle A of the Code, so it comes
within the section 6662 definition of income and any substantial understatement of the tax
would be subject to the penalty, if not supported by substantial authority. See supra note 92.
'43See § 1 4 02(a)(13).
1 Congress added the limited-partner exception to section 1 4 02(a) of the Code in 1977.
See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 313, 91 Stat. 1536. Wyoming
enacted the first limited liability company act in 1977. See Wyoming Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, ch. 158, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (repealed 2010); Susan Pace Hamill, The Origins
Behind the Limited Liability Company, 59 OmO ST. L.J. 1459, 1460 (1998).
'45See Reg. § 1.1402(a)-1(b); Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 C.B. 256.
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determine whether substantial authority supports excluding the allocation
from the definition of net earnings from self-employment under the limited-
partner exception.
Congress clearly focused on limited partners in enacting the limited-part-
ner exception with the concern that passive investors would qualify for Social
Security benefits by paying self-employment tax on their passive income from
limited partnerships."4 6 Thus, the limited-partner exception is designed to
prevent limited partners, who at the time the exception was enacted did not
participate in management of partnerships, from claiming their distributive
shares of partner income as net earnings from self-employment. Instead of
wishing to avoid the definition of limited partner and qualify for future Social
Security payments, high-income taxpayers now prefer to come within the
definition of limited partner to avoid having income classified as net earn-
ings from self-employment. The limited-partner exception appears to allow
limited partners who do participate in management to receive remunera-
tive payments from the partnership as net earnings from self-employment,
while their distributive shares of income are not considered net earnings
from self-employment. 7 Consider how Doug might analyze whether sub-
stantial authority supports excluding his allocation from the definition of
net earnings from self-employment. He would begin with the weight-of-
authority method.
The Tax Court recently held in Renkemeyer v. Commissioner that mem-
bers of a law firm limited liability partnership (LLP) and in Castigliola v.
Commissioner that members of a law firm professional limited liability com-
pany (PLLC) do not come within definition of limited partner for purposes
of the limited-partner exception. Thus, partnership income allocated to them
is considered net earnings from self-employment."' In each case, the per-
son in question had equal rights to management but had limited liability."'
The decisions show that, in deciding whether a member other than a state-
law limited partner comes within the definition of limited partner, courts
consider the nature of the member's management authority and not merely
whether the member has limited liability. In Renkemeyer, the partnership
would have been a general partnership if it had not registered as an LLP.5 o
Registration affected the partners' liability exposure, but not the partners'
management authority."' Partners of a general partnership have authority
"'See David W. Mayo & Rebecca C. Freeland, Delimiting Limited Partners: Self-Employ-
ment Tax ofLimited Partners, 66 TAx LAw. 391, 393-94 (2013).
'47See § 1 4 02(a)(13); Reg. § 1.1402(a)-1(b).
'4sSee Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137 (2011) (con-
sidering the status of a member of an LLP); Castigliola v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH)
1296, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-062 at 431 (considering the status of a member of a PLLC).
'9See Renkemeyer, 136 T.C. at 148; Castigliola, 65 T.C.M. at 1296, 2017 TC.M. (RIA)
¶ 2017-062 at 431.
51See Renkemeyer, 136 T.C. at 148.
'
51 See id.
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to act on behalf of the partnership. 152 In Castighola, the PLLC was member-
managed, 153 and members of a member-managed LLC have authority to act
on behalf the LLC. 1 5 Thus, parties in those cases had authority to act on
behalf of the entities in their capacity as members. This ability to act on behalf
of the entity in a member capacity distinguishes general partners, who have
state-granted authority to act on behalf of a limited partnership,1 5 5 from lim-
ited partners, who do not have state-granted authority to act on behalf of the
limited partnership. 15 The state-granted management authority appears to be
an important factor in excluding general partners and other members with
management authority from the traditional definition of limited partner.
These cases appear to be negative authorities for Doug's position, but he
can distinguish them from his situation. Doug has authority to act as a mem-
ber, but not exclusively through the state's grant of authority. Instead, Three
Person LLC's operating agreement restricts management authority to only
Doug. Although Doug has authority to act in his member capacity on behalf
of Three Person LLC, that authority derives from the operating agreement,
not solely from state law. Doug's sole authority to act on behalf of Three
Person LLC distinguishes his situation from the facts at issue in Renkemeyer
and Castigliola, in which all members had authority to act on behalf of the
entity. The ability to distinguish these cases would reduce their weight against
the reporting position he is considering.
In another recent case, Hardy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that a
physician-member's distributive share of income of a doctor-group LLC is
not subject to self-employment tax, even though the physician-member pro-
vided services to the LLC.15 7 The LLC was professionally managed, and the
physician had no management authority. 1 5 The physician was both an inves-
tor in the LLC and an investor in that group. 1 5 The physician received a fee
for services he provided, but also received a share of the LLC's income. 160 The
physician's distributive share of the income was not subject to self-employ-
ment tax because the physician received it in his capacity as an investor.'
Because the court held that an LLC member's distributive share of income
does not come within the definition of net earnings from self-employment,
1 52 See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 301 (1) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
1997) (amended 2013).
153See Castigliola, 65 T.C.M. at 1296, 2017 T.C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-062 at 431.
'
51See UNIF. LTD. LIAB. Co. ACT § 407(b) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS OF UNIF. STATE
LAws 2006) (amended 2013).
1 55 See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 402 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
2001) (amended 2013).
'
56See id. § 302.
'57See Hardy v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-016
at 28-29.
'
5
sSee id.
'
59See id.
1o See id.
l6lSee id.
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this case provides positive authority for Doug's claim that his distributive
share of income from Three Person LLC does not come within the definition
of net earnings from self-employment.
The strength of Hardy as positive authority is reduced, however, because
Doug has authority to act on behalf of Three Person LLC as a member. That
distinguishes him from the physician in Hardy, who did not appear to have
authority as a member to act on behalf of the LLC. Nonetheless, the court's
effectively treating a member of an LLC as a limited partner for purposes of
the definition of net earnings from self-employment does support Doug's
position that he, as a member of an LLC, can come within the definition of
limited partner. Thus, although Hardy is not directly on point, it is moder-
ately positive authority for Doug.
Doug could also argue that his authority to act on behalf of Three Person
LLC is different from the authority granted to the members in Renkemeyer
and Castigliola and distinguish his situation from those cases. He could also
argue that a person's authority to act on behalf of a partnership does not, in
itself, exclude the person from the definition of limited partner. The statute
recognizes that a person may be both a limited partner and provide services to
the limited partnership, and treats the limited partner's distributive share dif-
ferently from the limited partner's remuneration. 16 2 The statute's recognition
that a person can have dual capacities should be broad enough to encompass
a person who can be both a limited partner and a general partner, as allowed
by state law.163 The Hardy court also recognized that a member of an LLC can
be both an employee and an investor in an LLC, 164 recognizing the possibility
that a single person can have dual capacities. The statute and Hardy therefore
are positive authority for a person having dual capacities, one of which may
be a member of an LLC that is treated as a limited partner for purposes of the
definition of net earnings from self-employment.
The statute is also negative authority for Doug's position because it uses the
term "limited partner," and a member of an LLC is a not a limited partner
under the state-law definition.16 1 The decision in Hardy indicates that courts
read "limited partner," as used in the statute, to include more than state-
law limited partners. 166 Thus, Hardy diminishes the weight of the statute's
negative authority.
162See I.R.C. § 1 4 02(a)(13) (providing that the limited-partner exception applies to the
"limited partners, as such," suggesting that a limited partner could also receive payments
from a limited partnership in a capacity other than the limited-partner capacity); Reg.
§ 1.1402(a)-1(b).
'
63See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 109 (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS OF UNIF. STATE LAWS
2001) (amended 2013).
161See Hardy, 113 TC.M. (CCH) 1070, 2017 1C.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-016 at 31-32.
61 See UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 102(11) (NAT'L CONFERENCE COMMRS ON UNIF. STATE
LAws 2001) (amended 2013).
166See Hardy, 113 TC.M. (CCH) 1070, 2017 1C.M. (RIA) 12017-016 at 29-31.
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The legislative history is positive authority for Doug's position. The def-
inition of net earnings from self-employment is a federal statute that was
designed to exclude investment income from the definition of net earnings
from self-employment. 16 7 Therefore, it supports bifurcating some members'
status and excluding investment income from net earnings from self-employ-
ment, if the interest giving rise to such income does not generally bestow
management rights.
Treasury published proposed regulations that would bring some members
of LLCs within the definition of limited partner but could also exclude some
state law limited partners from the definition.' Those proposed regula-
tions applied a functional test and provided generally that a person would
be deemed to be a limited partner, subject to three exceptions.' The first
exception applies the traditional view of limited partners to exclude some
persons from the definition of limited partner. Traditionally, limited partners
were not liable for a limited partnership's obligations and had no authority
to act on behalf of the partnership. 170 The proposed regulations adopt that
traditional view of limited partner and exclude from the definition of limited
partner anyone who (1) has personal liability for the partnership's obligations
by reason of being a partner,17 1 (2) has authority to contract on behalf of the
partnership, 172 or (3) participates in the partnership's trade or business for
more than 500 hours during the partnership's taxable year. 173
The second exception provides that a person who holds more than one
class of interest in an entity may come within the definition of limited part-
ner with respect to one of the classes of interest, even if the person cannot
1'7See H.R. REP. No. 95-702, pt. 1, at 11 (1977) ("Under present law each partner's share
of partnership income is includable in his net earnings from self-employment for social secu-
rity purposes, irrespective of the nature of his membership in the partnership. The bill would
exclude from social security coverage, the distributive share of income or loss received by a
limited partner from the trade or business of a limited partnership. This is to exclude for cover-
age purposes certain earnings which are basically of an investment nature. However, the exclu-
sion from coverage would not extend to guaranteed payments (as described in 707(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code), such as salary and professional fees, received for services actually
performed by the limited partner for the partnership." (emphasis added)); Hardy, 113 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1070, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-016 at 29-31 (exempting the physician's income
from the definition of net earnings from self-employment because the physician received the
income in his capacity as an investor).
6SSee Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). The proposed regulations are
not finalized, and many practitioners believe that state-law classification as a limited partner
qualifies a person as a limited partner for purposes of section 1 4 02(a) (13).
169See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). The purpose of the func-
tional test was to ensure that similarly situated individuals owning interests in different types of
entities or entities from under different state statutes would be treated the same. See Definition
of Limited Partner for Self-Employment Tax Purposes, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997).
1See Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137, 147-50
(2011).
'7'See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
172See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
17See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(2)(iii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
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be considered a limited partner under the traditional view with respect to
another class of interest.17 ' A person can be considered a limited partner with
respect to one class of interest if at least one person who is considered a lim-
ited partner under the traditional view owns a substantial, continuing inter-
est in the particular class of interest,175 and the rights and obligations of the
person seeking limited-partner status are identical to the rights obligations of
the person who is limited partner under traditional view. 176
Under the third exception, a person who owns only one class of interest
and participates more than 500 hours during the partnership's taxable year
in the partnership's trade or business may come within the definition of lim-
ited partner.177 To do so, however, limited partners under the traditional view
must own a substantial and continuing interest in the class of interest the
person owns,17 and the rights and obligations of all holders of that interest
must be identical.179
The proposed regulations define class of interest for purposes of the tests as
"an interest that grants the holder specific rights and obligations."s0 Interests
belong to separate classes if one interest-holder's rights and obligations are
different from another holder's rights and obligations."' A person may hold
more than one class of interest in the same partnership if each class grants the
person different rights and obligations.182 Guaranteed payments made to a
person for services are not, however, relevant in determining the person's rights
and obligations or a class of interest.183 Thus, if the rights and obligations of
two members of an entity are otherwise identical, guaranteed payments made
to one of those members will not create a separate class of interests.
The proposed regulations include an example, which suggests that merely
holding the right to contract on behalf of an LLC as a manager does not
create a separate class of interest.' The entity in that example appears to
be manager-managed because the example provides that state law grants the
manager the authority to contract on behalf of the entity, and state law grants
such authority to managers of manager-managed LLCs."' If the entity is
17See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
17See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). The proposed regula-
tions apply a facts-and-circumstances analysis to the question of substantial interest, but also
provide that ownership of 20% or more of a class of interests is considered substantial. See
Prop. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h)(6)(iv), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
176See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
177See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
17sSee Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
17'See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(4)(ii), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
soSee Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
'See id.
'
82See id.
's
3See id.
'See Prop. Reg. § 1.1 4 02(a)-2(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
's
5See UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 4 07(c) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS ON UNIF.
STATE LAws 2006) (amended 2013).
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manager-managed, the authority to contract on behalf of the entity does not
derive from a membership interest, but from the management position. Thus,
the authority to contract on behalf of the LLC is not a right or obligation
granted by a membership interest.
Congress responded to the proposed regulations by urging Treasury to
withdraw them."' Congress appeared to be more concerned that the pro-
posed regulations would restrict the application of the statute and exclude
some limited partners from the definition, rather than being concerned that
the regulations would increase the scope of the statute and include members
of LLCs." 7 Treasury did not act in response to Congress's urging. The pro-
posed regulations' ultimate effect on this area of the law is uncertain. The
question remains whether members who participate in management may
exclude their non-remunerative distributive shares of income from an LLC
from the definition of net earnings from self-employment and treat the pro-
posed regulations as positive authority.
Doug could rely upon the proposed regulations to support his position that
a member of an LLC can hold dual capacities with respect to the LLC and
that allocations with respect to an investor interest are not net earnings from
self-employment. State law grants members of member-managed LLCs the
authority to act on behalf of the LLC.'" Doug could argue that his author-
ity is distinguished from the authority granted to the LLC member in the
example in the proposed regulations. If only one member has the authority to
act on behalf of the LLC, this authority arguably would create a class of inter-
est that differs from a class held by other members who have the right to vote
and receive distributions but do not have the authority to contract on behalf
of the LLC. "I The member who has the authority to act on behalf of the LLC
could hold two classes of interests under the proposed regulations definition
of class of interest.o Thus, Doug could argue that the proposed regulations
support extending his allocations from net earnings from self-employment.
The strength of that authority is arguably weakened by Congress's urging
Treasury to withdraw the proposed regulations, but Treasury has not acted to
withdraw them and they are a permitted authority."' Doug would therefore
consider them in determining whether substantial authority supports exclud-
ing the allocations from net earnings from self-employment.
Thus, Doug has both negative authorities, which he can distinguish
from his situation, and positive authorities that support the dual capacity
of a member of an LLC. The negative authorities include the statute's use
of the term "limited partner" and the distinguished cases Renkemeyer and
"'See 143 CONG. REc. 13,168 (1997).
's 7See id.
'See UNIF. LTD. LiAB. Co. ACT § 407(b) (NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMRS ON UNIF.
STATE LAws 2006) (amended 2013).
'"See Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(6)(i), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
l9oSee Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
'9'See Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii).
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Castigiola.192 The positive authorities include: the statute, which recognizes
that limited partners can provide services and receive remuneration; Hardy,
which is not directly on point, but does recognize that an LLC member can
come within the statute's definition of limited partner;193 the legislative his-
tory, which states that income allocated to an investor should not be treated
as net earnings from self-employment; and the proposed regulations, which
recognize that a person can hold multiple classes of interests, one of which can
be an investor class.1' These authorities appear to be fairly evenly weighted
for and against Doug's reporting position. With no clear guidance on how to
weigh the respective authorities, Doug could conclude that they are evenly
weighted, which would translate into a 50% (1 - (1 + 1)) on the horizontal-
substantiality scale. To be conservative, he might conclude that the positive
authority is less than 50%, perhaps 40%, which would translate to approxi-
mately 29% (0.4 - (1 + 0.4)) on the horizontal-substantiality scale.
The well-reasoned method overlaps with the weight-of-authority method,
but it appears to favor Doug. The well-reasoned argument begins by recogniz-
ing that business practices have changed since the enactment of the limited-
partner exception in the definition of net earnings from self-employment.
The advent of LLCs requires courts to recognize that the statute is outdated,
and that they must consider the purpose of the statute when considering
allocations to a member of an LLC that has a dual capacity, one of which is
investor. Doug can argue that his non-management interest is like a limited
partnership interest because it provides limited liability and allows Doug to
participate in the profits of Three Person LLC as an investor with other mem-
bers who own similar investment interests and are clearly investors.
Doug could also use an equity analysis to support his position. Tax law
distinguishes between compensation and dividends paid to members of S
corporations for employment tax purposes. Compensation paid to members
of S corporations for services they render is subject to employment tax.' 9 By
contrast, and subject to the payment of reasonable compensation, dividends
paid to members of S corporations (even those who provide services) are
not subject to employment tax and do not come within the definition of
net earnings from self-employment.96 Thus, tax law recognizes dual capacity
for purposes of the employment tax in the S corporation context. As shown
above, the law also recognizes the dual capacity in the limited partnership
'
92Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 137 (2011); Castigli-
ola v. Commissioner, 113 TC.M. (CCH) 1296, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-062.
1
93Hardy v. Commissioner, 113 TC.M. (CCH) 1070, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-016.
'
94Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997).
95 See, e.g., David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa 2010).
196 See id.
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context and LLC context for member-employees. 197 Doug could reason that
for employment tax purposes, the distinction between those arrangements
and Doug's arrangement is formalistic. Consequently, equity dictates that the
law should treat Doug's distributive share of income from Three Person LLC
in the same manner that it treats the distributive shares of income to a limited
partner and to members of an S corporation.
Based on the well-reasoned analysis, Doug might conclude that this rea-
soning is sufficient to move the 29% derived from the weight-of-authority
method at least 11 percentage points. If that is correct, substantial authority
would support Doug's position that the allocations are not earnings from self-
employment. Doug can take further comfort knowing that the Tax Court did
not impose substantial-understatement penalties in the two cases discussed
above that went against the taxpayers. 98
V. Conclusion
This Article presents a quantitative model for predicting the likelihood
that a reporting position will be upheld. The model presents the concepts
of horizontal substantiality and vertical substantiality. It incorporates the
weight-of-authority method into vertical substantiality to derive the vertical-
substantiality quotient, which presents the relationship of weight of positive
authorities to the weight of negative authorities. That derivation helps reveal
that the weight-of-authority method typically does not alone determine the
likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld. When the vertical-sub-
stantiality quotient is translated into a value on the horizontal-substantiality
scale, the resulting value should be less than the vertical-substantiality quo-
tient. Applying the well-reasoned method after translating the vertical-sub-
stantiality quotient to a value on the horizontal-substantiality scale helps a
taxpayer determine the likelihood that a reporting position will be upheld.
After presenting the model, the Article demonstrates its potential appli-
cation revealing that the model will only have value if reliable values can
be affixed to positive and negative authorities and to the value of well-rea-
soned arguments. Applying the model also demonstrates that the distinction
between the weight-of-authority method and the well-reasoned method is
not always clear. Taxpayers often struggle to apply permitted authorities to a
reporting position without resorting to legal reasoning, and legal reasoning
often draws upon permitted authorities. Application of the model also reveals
one line of analysis for each of the issues. Other attorneys may approach the
analyses differently, even if they rely upon the same authorities. The ability to
reach different conclusions regarding application of authorities and reasoning
197See supra text accompanying notes 162-164; see also Definition of Limited Partner for
Self-Employment Tax Purposes, 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (Jan. 13, 1997) (referring to comments
regarding the proposed regulations that argued the statute and legislative history support the
dual-capacity application of the law).
'
9
sSee Renkemeyer, Campbell & Weaver, LLP v. Commissioner, 136 TC. 137 (2011); Cas-
tigliola v. Commissioner, 113 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296, 2017 TC.M. (RIA) ¶ 2017-062.
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may prevent predicting the likelihood of a position being upheld from ever
becoming a perfect science.
Despite the quantitative model's shortcomings, it provides some promise.
It helps delineate the distinction and relative significance of the two types
of analytical methods in the substantial-authority regulations. It also moves
closer to a system that provides quantifiable measurements of the likelihood
that a reporting position will be upheld. Additional thought in this area may
help refine legal analysis and spur the creation of more exact standards for
applying the law and legal reasoning. Additional research may also help elimi-
nate some of the barriers that prevent full implementation of a quantitative
prediction model for substantial authority.
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